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It was the purpose of this paper to examine the
necessity for the association of research and development
with the national defense requirement; to determine the
methods and procedures utilized by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and,
particularly, the Department of Defense to achieve this
association; and, finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of
the research and development funds expended to support the
established defense policies.
Today, as never before, national defense focuses on
the technical question, and it has been postulated that
technological surprise may represent the primary danger to
national security. This emphasis on the technological
dimension of decision-making requires that research and
development be utilized to erect a national military posture
to meet the long-terra needs of security.
The author has analyzed this scientific-military
phenomenon in its relationship to the defense policy of the
United States.
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THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Today, the United States is faced with two major
realities: (1) the increasing role of science and tech-
nology in defense policy decisions, and (2) the increasing
Federal support for research and development. These two
aspects are often contrasted as the "role of science in
government" and the "role of government in science." While
they are closely related, it is important to recognize that
they often pose quite different problems and, in fact, are
often confused. To present what is perhaps the clearest
example of the interaction of these two forces, this thesis
will examine how the knowledge of nature and technique is
organized to affect the possibilities for decision-making in
the field of national defense. It is in this area that the
technical performance of weapons systems has direct bearing
on the ability to carry out national policies and on the
choices which are considered tenable.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
It becomes clear from the almost daily recital of
issues before the President and before the Congress that
research and development for national defense is a major
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2element in the most excruciating decisions that must be
made. The United States is engaged in a technological war
which has no current prospect of ending* This fact sets the
goal of substantial technological superiority—a superiority
which provides the flexibility to react quickly to changing
conditions in a highly unpredictable world. Since the
"closed society" nature of certain nations makes it diffi-
cult to assess accurately their technological capabilities,
an attempt must be made to stay well ahead of all possible
enemies far into the future.
During the past two decades, there has been a growing
awareness of the relationships between threat, strategy, and
national security on the one hand, and research and develop-
ment on the other. Not only is there more Intimate involve-
ment of technology in many vital national decisions today
than in times past, but there is also an accelerating tempo
of activity, an increasing complexity of issues involved, an
increasing number of alternatives, and a growing seriousness
in the consequences of error. From determinations at the
national level on key elements of strategy come the deci-
sions which shape research and development in terms of
required weapons systems and supporting technology. Re-
search and development must respond to meet successfully its
principal objective—that of providing superior weapons
systems required for national survival.
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3It is expected that over fifteen billion dollars have
been expended on research and development by various activi-
ties of the Government during fiscal year 1965. This expen-
diture, although representing but 15 per cent of the total
Federal budget, is, in effect, well over one-third of that
portion of the budget which is susceptible to control, since
a great part of the budget is committed to fixed require-
ments, such as debt retirement, interest, veterans* benefits,
subsidies and prior-year commitments for capital expendi-
tures. If funding is any indication, the amount spent for
research and development emphasizes the priority that has
been placed on meeting national defense needs. It was the
purpose of this study to examine the necessity for the asso-
ciation of science with the defense requirement, to deter-
mine the methods and procedures utilized by the Federal
Government to achieve this association, and to evaluate the
effectiveness of the research and development expenditures
to support the established defense policies.
Value of the Study
The Government's organization for research and
development has not evolved according to any master plan.
Support has traditionally been scattered throughout the
Government, with research and development primarily a means
to the ends of each agency. World War II brought a striking
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4expansion in Federal support of technological programs and
funds for this effort, while already in the billions, is
annually being increased. The Department of Defense, which
is demonstrating a remarkable faith in science, supports a
vast research and development program, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Atomic Energy
Commission have been created, each with heavy responsibili-
ties in the field. An overwhelming preponderance of the
Federal research and development budget is allocated to the
above three agencies whose programs are intimately related
to national defense. The responsibility for the planning,
organization, and management for research and development is
assigned to these Federal agencies in line with their pre-
scribed missions. If the Federal Government contributes to
these missions with such determination as is indicated by
the percentage of the Federal budget allocated, it is reason-
able to question to what extent these funds contribute to
national defense. The most relevant considerations and
judgments must be focused on major national choices, includ-
ing the area of defense. How much can be afforded and where
among several competing end-uses shall the limited resources
of this country be placed:' These are the kinds of choices
that a loosely-knit system of public and private decision-
making have traditionally accomplished with considerable







5uncertain world call for an extraordinary effort to encom-
pass technical considerations with which the majority of
people are largely unfamiliar.
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Research and Development
"Research and development" is a composite term which
covers an enormous variety of activities in the natural and
social sciences ranging from the most abstract mathematical
inquiry on the one hand to the most practical designing,
testing, and evaluating of a new device on the other. If
the primary objective is to make further improvements on the
product or process, then the work comes within the defini-
tion of research and development. All too often, these
activities have been collectively called "science" when, in
fact, they represent a diversity of functions and interests
as wide as the Federal Government itself. Therefore, the
activities connected with research and development are
broken down into two sets of categories in this study. One
set defines the activities in the traditional scientific
terms and the second set expands these terms as interpreted
by the Department of Defense. An attempt has been made in
this paper to limit the discussion of all facets of research
and development to the physical sciences, which include the
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6engineering sciences. These three categories of physical
science are defined as follows: (1) physical sciences
proper are concerned primarily with the understanding of the
natural phenomena associated with non-living things; (2)
mathematical science employs logical reasoning with the aid
of symbols and is concerned with the development of methods
of operations utilizing such symbols; and (3) engineering
science, which is concerned with studies directed toward
making specific scientific principles usable in engineering
practice. Such sciences as life, psychological, and social,
which are considered as being only indirectly associated
with defense in such tangible dimensions, are intentionally
not included in this study.
National Defense
The ideals of the United States have historically
tended toward a certain kind of world order, an order based
on the rule of law, on free and independent nations dealing
with one another to their mutual benefit and peacefully
settling their disputes with one another. Fundamentally,
the Nation's objectives might be summed up as follows:
globally, a more stable world, and domestically, a nation
where government and machine serve humanity. But the first
responsibility is to the security and welfare of the citi-
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7The uninterrupted crises in world affairs since the
end of World War II have led to a minor revolution in poli-
tics, particularly international relations and foreign policy,
in the United States. The increased tempo of international
change, at first, led to an emphasis on the attempt to use
information provided by the social sciences in the formula-
tion of responses to the rapid succession of international
crises confronting the United States. This essentially-
pragmatic approach, firmly rooted in traditional American
values proved suggestive, but could not adequately explain a
world in which fundamental change had become commonplace.
It did, however, lead to a new awareness that a painstaking
search for theoretical first principles must be undertaken.
Typical of this search has been the increased atten-
tion paid to a vaguely-defined area called national security,
usually located somewhere in the academic discipline of
international relations. Two situations, both encouraging
specialization, were realized. These situations were the
growing complexity of international affairs, and the in-
creasingly self-conscious involvement of the United States
as the leader of a world system. An army of specialists in
the Government, in independent research institutions, and at
universities, began working in such basic areas as the
choice of military strategies and appropriate weapons systems;
the allocation of economic resources to competing defense and
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8non-defense needs; the role of scientists in national
policy-making; the political setting for strategic decision-
making; the problem of alliances and coalitions; the techni-
cal, economic, and political challenges of disarmament; the
institutions and techniques for international cooperation;
and the creation of a world community. This search for
objective criteria inevitably led the experts to analyze the
theoretical foundations of a national security policy.
National security policy, then, came to be basically
defined as the complete range of integrated decisions and
courses of actions taken to secure national objectives. But
security and national objectives are equally as elusive in
definition. Security covers a range of goals so wide that
highly-divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of
security. If security becomes a matter of a value judgment,
the Nation is secure when it feels secure and the amount of
defense needed to maintain this security is simply "enough."
The policies adopted by a government chosen by the people
obviously should be designed to serve their objectives and
these become the national objectives. Defined in terms
relating solely to Federal research and development, such
objectives include the generally-accepted propositions of
increasing the gross national product of the country and
personal wealth of individuals, improving the standards of








9world, maintaining a strong defensive posture, upholding a
high level of employment, and conserving certain natural
resources* These are the criteria examined by the legisla-
tive committees charged with authorizing appropriations to
support a defense research and development policy.
If the concept that national security is the ability
of a nation to protect its internal values from external
threats is accepted, national security policy may be roughly
subdivided into two categories. The first category would be
that of foreign policy, which is concerned mainly with rela-
tions with other states; and the second category would be
that of defense policy, which is the decisions and courses
of action taken to organize and bring to bear military power
to secure national aims. These areas overlap and are inter-
dependent in complex ways and any policy-level official who
is concerned with one area must also be concerned with the
other. Sometimes a third subdivision of national security
policy is identified; that is, domestic policy. This area
pertains to internal action taken in support of external
national objectives. Domestic policy is not treated sepa-
rately here because it is an interest common to practially
all agencies of the national government.
The problem of research and development as examined
in this paper is centered on the second category, that of
national defense. The attempt to achieve the indispensable
& B ££. mt








national objectives through national defense involves moral
questions and human values—political, social, economic, and
psychological questions as well as technological ones. But
today, as never before, national defense focuses on the
technical question, and it has been suggested that techno-
logical surprise presents the primary danger to security.
This new emphasis on the technological dimension of decision-
making requires an orientation to the manifold practical
task of erecting a national military posture to meet the
long-term needs of security. In this dimension, decisions
are concerned with lead time, or the period between the con-
ception of a program and its completion or implementation,
and military functions and capabilities. The technological
planner conceptualizes in terms of components of national
power plotted against future time, and the concrete deci-
sions made are predicated on the initiation of programs,
procurement, and the training of the forces required.
There are those who maintain that national security
has decreased even though military power has increased and
see no solution in the technological dimension. But it must
be remembered that the technological decisions of today are
the basis on which the strategic environment of tomorrow
will be based, by setting the limits of future United States
positive action as well as performing the negative function






XXX • ORGANIZATION OP REMAINDER OF THE THESIS
In the foreword to the Study submitted to the Commit-
tee on Government Operations, titled Science Organization
and the President's Office , Senator Henry M. Jackson pointed
out that the tide of political power flows with the tide of
scientific and technical power. He maintained that, whereas
a decade ago the United States scientific and technical
leadership was taken for granted, today it is being effec-
tively challenged.
The determination of the broad direction and scale of
the Governments part in the national scientific effort is
the duty of the President. He establishes the priorities
and makes the decisions that enlist science and technology
in support of foreign policy and defense goals. He is ulti-
mately responsible for the wise employment of that portion
of the national budget which is spent annually for research
and development. Since the Bureau of the Budget coordinates
the whole Federal budget, the most effective means of con-
trol of research and development is at that level. Science
advisers may give lofty advice and complex recommendations
but, in the end, the words must be converted into deeds and
the funds requested by a government agency to accomplish
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The Jackson Subcommittee felt that when parochial
scientific counsel is measured against the perspective of
the President's office it, like economic and military ad-
vice, must be subject to civilian control. The President,
in shaping and guiding the Government's science and techno-
logical effort, is critically dependent upon able leadership
and staffing within the executive departments and agencies*
No one person in government, nor any one committee of direc-
tors
,
can have detailed knowledge across the whole spectrum
of science. This truism can just as well be applied to
research and development for national defense.
Science and technology within the national defense
structure can be traced back almost to the beginning of the
Republic. The first chapter of this paper attempts to trace
the effect that science has had on defense and vice versa.
It was found that the link between the scientist and the
soldier had to be maintained to promote national security,
but this led to the search for the most satisfactory methods
of achieving such a relationship. Prior to World War II,
the Federally-sponsored scientific activities were largely
confined to government-owned installations. The war altered
this pattern. In addition to enlarging its own performance
capacity, the Government found it necessary to seek talent
and resources wherever they existed or could be assembled.
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13
contributions of great value to the war effort were made by
the staffs of colleges and universities, hospitals, private
research laboratories , other non-profit institutions and
research centers. The trends established during the war
have continued, but in more pronounced terms.
Eight government departments and agencies now support
the major national technological effort, and almost all the
other parts of the Government use science in varying degrees
to help meet their agency objectives. During 1964, or
earlier, virtually every major department and agency having
scientific programs elevated research and development to the
policy level, appointing an Assistant Secretary or a Direc-
tor specifically for this activity. This emphasis reflects
the very nature of science itself. The President and his
assistants are charged with ordering and focusing scattered
programs in the right direction. If optimum use is to be
made of the available scientific and engineering manpower
resources, programs must be carefully planned and these
resources concentrated where they will make the greatest
contributions to the defense posture. But, since there is
no Supreme Court of Science, except the testing ground of
nature itself, the President cannot afford to rely on any
one source of scientific advice. Chapters II through V
present the methods employed by this multi-scientific ad-












development effort as it applies to the national defense
program. The concern for security and the potential of
modern technology cause most of the research and development
funds to be dedicated to this area. A definition of the
programs pursued and a description of the various methods of
achieving technological results are discussed.
It becomes obvious that, in deciding on defense re-
search and development programs, the President will gener-
ally find his choice facilitated by the existence of
multiple and independent sources of scientific advice. This
is a condition that prevails in the case of many of the de-
partments and agencies whose actions have significant for-
eign policy consequences, especially in the use of scientists
by the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
These three agencies are not only more directly connected to
the national defense field, but, perhaps because this is so,
absorb the great majority of Federal research and develop-
ment expenditures. Their programs, as they pertain to the
defense effort, are, therefore, discussed Individually.
The last six chapters focus on the one department
most significant to the national defense effort, the Depart-
ment of Defense. This department has developed an extensive
and intricate organization for the conduct of research and




should be of more than academic interest since the greatest
share of responsibility for national defense through re-
search and development is centered here. Each of the
Military Services is subject to the guidance and control of
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and, there-
fore, attention is centered on that part of the Department
of Defense. The question of adequacy for the broad category
of the defense program, research and development, is by its
very nature difficult to answer with certainty. The ability
to perceive future requirements is limited, and many of the
undertakings in this area must be viewed as insurance
premiums—hedges against possible future developments that
may never occur. But where contingencies exist and can be
identified, they must be provided for. Therefore, the
methods of providing the scientific and technical informa-
tion required by the policy-makers to pursue effectively a
national defense program are explored. The majority of this
paper has been constructed from Congressional hearings and
reports; and through these dialogues, a presentation of the
Federal research and development program, as related to




SCIENCE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
Science has, within the last few decades, stimulated
in an amazing manner the efforts of man to control his envi-
ronment and adapt it to his use. The laboratories make
possible repeated experiments and provides the researcher
with an opportunity to observe phenomena, time and time
again, under identical conditions. The use of mathematics
as a tool of investigation has added to the competence of
the scientist in this increasingly-complex world. The
ability of scientists and engineers to apply laboratory
principles to specific problems has given a great impetus to
the advance of technology. Among nations, therefore, the
race for national preeminence in industrial and military
technology has become, to no small extent, one between
scientists. But, up to the time of the launching of a
Soviet satellite in October, 1957, the United States had
been exceedingly careless regarding the scientific aspects
of international competition. It was determined, at that
time, that, if the rate of scientific rivalry were not
increased, the United States would be doomed to a position
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, "The
Economics of National Security," Research and Development
,
Vol. VTII (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 11.
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of inferiority in science, which would later lead to a de-
cline to second place in technology, political influence,
and military strength. American interest in scientific and
engineering education and research and development had been
tremendously stimulated by one manifestation of Russian
progress. The value of science to national defense, which
had been made clear in World War II, was now strikingly re-
emphasized.
I. THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE
Expansion of Federal Support
During the middle of the twentieth century, scien-
tific method began to play a rapidly-increasing part in the
advance of technology with many industrial corporations
creating their own departments of research and development.
But industrial technology was not the only sector to make
great use of research and development. The scientific ac-
tivities fostered by the Federal Government, mainly for the
purpose of national defense, also provided for radical
changes in military technology. Research and development
activities, on which the continued effectiveness of all the
defense forces depends, became one of the major programs by
which the Defense Department provided the military diversity
t
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and flexibility required for the security of the nation.
Aside from national defense, science and technology are also
of increasing significance to other Federal programs.
Therefore, it is perhaps not startling that today fifteen
cents of every American tax dollar is spent by the Federal
Government for research and development and, through its
programs, the Government supports two-thirds of the entire
national effort. What is striking is the leap in levels of
Government-supported research and development from the pre-
World War II years to the present. In 1940, the Government
spent only seventy-four million dollars for research and
development. By 1953, this figure had risen to about two
billion dollars and, for fiscal 1965, expenditures are ex-
3pected to exceed fifteen billion dollars.
Criteria for Established Priorities
-~ m mm» ii—^iwhwim Him ^mi —! ! ^ m i wnai .
The Federal research and development programs reflect
largely the national defense and foreign policy objectives
2United States Bureau of the Budget, The Budget in
Brief : Fiscal Year 1965 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1964), p7T6.
Perhaps the most significant thing that can be said
about these figures is that, isolated, they are misleading.
At best, they may be educated estimates and generalizations.
To make an accurate comparison between today* s level of sup-
port and that of former years, for example, one must consider
not only the changes in dollar values but also the change in
the Federal agency's definitions. These definitions now in-
clude, as research and development, many items and projects
which, in former times, may have been found and funded in
other administrative categories.
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established since World War II, and the investments are con-
centrated in three areas that absorb approximately 90 per
cent of the Federal research and development budget. These
three areas are the military, space, and atomic energy—by
4
magnitude in the order named. Major resource allocations
must be and are made by the Government; and these alloca-
tions cannot deal with program details, but they indicate
the overall importance of each activity to the defense of
the United States. Research and development programs are no
exception, and their overall level must be decided as a com-
bination of three basic factors: (1) the need, (2) the
technological progress, and (3) the available resources.
The national posture has come to depend less on production
capacity in being and more on the race for shorter lead
times in the development and deployment of new weapon sys-
tems and of countermeasures against similar systems in the
hands of potential enemies. Modern technology has endowed
arms competition with a self-sustaining quality. Many new
steps have to be taken, less for any clearly-conceived
political or even strategic purpose than for fear of missing
an important point that one's adversary may exploit in the
accelerating process of research and development. The
4
"Research: By 1970, a $20 Billion Plateau?," Busi-










national goal, as expressed by President Johnson in his
fiscal year 1966 Budget message, is to maintain a strong
research and development program to insure that United States
forces are always the most modern in the world.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC-
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
Historical Trends
The cooperation of scientists and the Armed Forces is
not a new relationship. As a result of the interest of a
number of American scientists and Government officials, the
National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863, for the
purpose of providing scientific advice to the United States
Government. The use made of this Academy by the War Depart-
ment between 1863-1913 bespeaks a bygone era. During those
years, the Department requested the Academy to constitute
scientific committees on exactly five matters to further
that agency's mission:
A. Tests for the purity of whiskey,
B. Preservation of paint on Array knapsacks,
C. Galvanic action from the association of zinc and
iron,
D. Exploration of the Yellowstone, and
E. Meteorological science and its application. 5
5United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Science and Technology Act of 1958 , Staff
Study (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^8), p.
115.






It would be unfair to presume from this list that the War
Department was uninterested in new weapons systems; but,
until the turn of the century, military technology, like
industrial technology, generally developed independently of
advances in basic scientific skill.
What transformed the relationship between science and
war was the fact that, in the twentieth century, the develop*
ment of technology became increasingly dependent upon ad-
vances in basic knowledge about the physical world. As a
technically-advanced nation, both the rate of technological
innovation and the growth of new scientific knowledge began
increasing exponentially. Crudely measured by the volume of
scientific publications, scientific knowledge has been
doubling every ten to fifteen years.
Conflicting Philosophies
A number of scientists have advanced the proposition
that the military tends to be more interested in improving
existing weapons than in developing radically new ones, and
they argue that a separate civilian agency be established to
undertake new development. Both scientists and military
have explained the difference in their approach to military
Ellis A. Johnson, "The Crisis in Science and Tech-
nology and its Effect on Military Development," Operations
Research , VI (January-February, 1958), 14-15.
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research and development, "quantum Jumps versus improve-
ments," with the hypothesis that the soldier's interest in
developing entirely new weapons must always be inhibited by
his concern for the possibility that war may come in the
near future and, in this event, his interests are best
served by improving existing weapons. A current example of
this controversy, and where the scientists gained their
objective of at least a new name for a weapons system and
the military gained their objective of improving an existing
system, is the POSEIDON submarine-launched ballistic missile.
In order to emphasize the improved capabilities of the ex-
isting POLARIS missile which was achieved by increasing the
payload weight and volume, as well as accuracy, the com-
bination of change was to be called the POSEIDON system.
An explantion less flattering to the military for
this difference of philosophy is the occasional assertion
by scientists that theirs is a profession which stimulates
original and creative thoughts, while that of the military
tends to develop minds which accept the existing situation
without too much question. This is a judgment the scientists
may extend to the diplomat and the politician as well.
Scientists have been demanding and searching for quantum
7jumps ever since the end of World War II, and this search
7Warner R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy and
















is certainly not excluded from the defense aspect of na-
tional objectives. While scientific advisers are considered
professional experts in their special fields, they also
often have strong opinions about the morality or political
utility of development in the laboratory. Since scientists
are, after all, human, beliefs could be allowed to color
technical judgments with special causes receiving priority.
It would appear then that, while, in the main, the tech-
nologist contributes to the defense policy of this nation,





FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
TRADITIONAL CONCEPT
The term "research and development," as used In the
Federal budget, means the conduct of activities intended to
obtain new knowledge or to apply existing knowledge to new
uses. The Department of Defense uses the term "research,
development, test and evaluation," which is a somewhat
fuller but more cumbersome term for the same concept. For
more clarity, the term should actually be separated into
"research" and "development." It is confusing, in many
instances, to talk about them in the same way because they
are often approached differently. A development program,
with its heavy cost schedule and its goal of a single device
or the system as a whole, is usually a different problem
than a research tool of exploring and gaining knowledge.
I. RESEARCH VERSUS DEVELOPMENT
Research
The Federal Government finances research not only to
accomplish agency missions—usually a forerunner to deve
ment—but also to increase the broad body of scientific and
technical knowledge which underlies the future advancement
of the Nation's welfare, economic growth and security. This
'
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is not only true of basic research conducted primarily in
academic institutions, but also in government, industrial,
and other laboratories focusing on fundamental problems.
While research xs a relatively small portion of the
total effort, the potential productive payoff is immense.
In contrast to development, research is more diffuse in its
objectives, less structural in its organization, necessarily
freed from a definite time schedule, and susceptible to
X
advance planning only as new knowledge is developed.
Development
Development, on the other hand, is supported to
design, fabricate, test, and evaluate prototypes of materi-
als, devices, systems or processes needed to accomplish
specific agency missions. These include prototypes of com-
plex devices, such as military weapons, space vehicles,
nuclear weapons, and "systems" for such programs as air
defense or air traffic control.
Because development is pointed toward we11-developed
objectives the total level of support and the balance be-
tween the alternatives can be better decided on the basis of
some assessment of what each project can contribute to
national goals. Here it should be possible to set
Jerome B. Wiesner, /here Science and Politics Meet











priorities. Development planning is comparatively straight-
forward and quantifiable, and the conduct of programs is
subject to normal management principles with control over
cost and quality* Choices in research are often more com-
. 2plex.
Federal funds for development are double those for
research and nearly four-fifths of all the development funds
are spent through contracts with industry. The balance is
spent chiefly in Federally-operated centers, particularly
those of the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics
3
and Space Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
II . ACTIVITIES
Research and development is also a phrase that de-
scribes a number of different kinds of activities. In the
traditional concept, these activities are subdivided into
five major headings:
1. Fundamental research;
2. Supporting research or exploratory development;
3. Feasibility studies, operations analysis, and
technical advice;
4. Development and engineering of products,
processes or systems; and
5. Test and evaluation activities.
2Ibid
. , p. 70.
3United States Bureau of the Budget, Federal Research
,
Development , and Related Programs , Special Analysis H
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 444.
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Basic research is scientific inquiry undertaken to
obtain knowledge and an understanding of natural laws, and
to gain a comprehension of relationships among phenomena not
previously understood. This type of research does not aim
at the creation of practical mechanisms; its goal is that of
understanding, Basic research obviously does not always
produce tangible, immediately usable, or spectacular results.
The tendency, then, may be to cut funds for basic research
when "research and development funds look too high." Such
policies are considered generally ill-conceived for the
following reasons:
1. Basic research is generally relatively inexpen-
sive;
2. The lack of basic knowledge can increase the cost
of later stage research more than cutting the
basic project might save;
3. The cutbacks affect primarily the capacities of
universities to train qualified scientific and
technical manpower; and
4. The long-term goals are never achieved adequately.
It should be pointed out that fundamental research
holds the key to any radical change to be made in technology.
Unless the curiosity of American students for uncovering the
relationships of natural phenomena is encouraged and devel-
oped, the future of this country in a world of competitive
4power politics is by no means secure.
4
The cost of all such work to the leading sponsors of









The general principles uncovered by basic research
are of practical value as the foundation for specific proj-
ects to create new devices or processes. The beginning of a
specific project takes place when, in some fertile and
imaginative mind, an idea for practical change assumes form.
An inspiration for a new device or technique may come from
any of a variety of people, including scientists, independ-
ent inventors, executives, workers at the various levels of
production, salesmen, or consumers of the product to be
improved. Or, it may arise from an organized attack on a
problem by a group of investigators who, when the need has
been recognized, have been set to work to originate a plan
to bring about the required improvements.
Advancements in military technology are spurred by
competition between rival states involving the deadly seri-
ous matter of national survival. Ideas in this field may
arise in the research staffs of Army, Navy, or Air Force
laboratories, or from college, industrial, or institutional
contractors working on military research. This exploratory
research, which means investigation in a certain field to
research and development expenditures. United States Con-
gress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Govern-
ment Research, National Goals and Policies , Study Number X
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 26.
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discover possibilities for technical improvement, has proven
to be one of the most likely sources of ideas for change.
Feasibility Studies
Sometimes termed applied research, this type of re-
search is concerned with the practical application of knowl-
edge or understanding gained (often defined as all research
except basic research). In the earlier phases of the crea-
tion of a new device or process, there often remains much
applied research to be accomplished. This consists of
study, investigation, and experimentation to determine the
best methods by which a specific device or process may be
developed.
Development and Engineering
Development is the systematic use of scientific
knowledge directed toward the production of useful materials,
devices, systems or methods, including design and development
of prototypes and processes. A model is often built up from
a small breadboard layout intended to demonstrate a prin-
ciple, or a full-scale prototype which incorporates the
characteristics agreed upon. Before the development stage
is ended, the prototype must operate to the satisfaction of
the agency or department which expects to produce it or
supervise its production, or in the case of the Defense





After the prototype has been accepted, a limited
number may be produced so that they may be tested under
service conditions. After development and testing, the ac-
cepted prototype or process and the test data are gone over
by the production engineers, in some cases design engineers,
for redesigning to fit the system of mass production.
Test and Evaluation
During the various steps in research and development,
there must be continuous and careful evaluation of the idea
which is to be put in practical form. Basic research must
be scrutinized to ascertain what new practical applications
are possible. When the specific idea is created, it must be
tested by applied research to find out its merit. Continu-
ous emphasis on evaluation at every important step can re-
duce the probability of serious errors and add to the
efficiency of research and development.






FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
FACILITIES AND MANPOWER
Facilities which are considered as conducting re-
search and development consist of those organizations with
the primary aim of either developing new knowledge or apply-
ing existing knowledge to new uses. These activities may be
carried out in government installations or in the facilities
of private, State, or local organizations using Federal
funds. Generally excluded from these categories are organi-
zations which expend funds for experimental production,
information activities, and training programs. The analysis
also omits expenditures for research performed independently
by contractors within overhead arrangements on some procure-
ment contracts funded in Defense Department procurement
accounts. Expenditures for the collection of general-
purpose statistics by the Census Bureau and other agencies
are also excluded.
Expenditures for "research and development facilities"
also include amounts for physical facilities, such as land,
buildings, and major equipment, regardless of whether the
facility is to be used or owned by the Federal Government or
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I. FACILITIES AND MISSIONS
Since there are several thousand public and private
enterprises engaged in research and development for defense,
and in the light of the widely-varied requirements, and the
importance of the results sought, it is of interest to con-
sider briefly the types of agencies now available and the
missions they are expected to perform. An analysis of
their respective characteristics and functions will be pre-
sented, as well as the relative amount of the total Federal
research and development budget they consume. Arranged in
order of decreasing proximity to and control by the Govern-
ment, they can be described as:
1, In-house government laboratories and organiza-
tions, such as the Naval Research Laboratory;
2, Government-owned, contractor-operated organiza-
tions which are privately staffed and managed
for the Government, such as the Oak Ridge
Atomic Energy Laboratories
;
3, University associated research centers, such as
the Applied Physics Laboratory (Johns Hopkins
University)
;
4, Non-profit private foundations, such as the RAND
Corporation;
5, Colleges and universities, such as the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology; and
6, Private, profit-making organizations, such as
Westinghouse.
The Department of Defense alone has contracts with
over three hundred universities and not-for-profit institu-
tions. United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations , Report to the President on Government
Contracting for Research and Development TWashington
:
Government Printing Office, 1962)
,
p. 28.








The feature which these organizations have in common, and
which permits them to be of service, is the presence of per-
sonnel of unusual qualifications, and sometimes, the avail-
ability of unique facilities useful for research and
development or related operations.
Although there may not be entire agreement as to the
detailed functions of any of the agencies listed above, con-
sensus is normally achieved in regard to their outstanding
characteristics which are presented below.
The In-House Governmental Laboratory
These organizations are parts of major departments or
agencies of the Government and, as such, are staffed by
personnel employed by the Government and subject to govern-
mental regulations and requirements. They enjoy a close and
continuing relationship to the agency they serve, which
permits maximum responsiveness to the needs of that agency
and a maximum sense of sharing the mission. Such operations
accordingly have a natural advantage in conducting research,
feasibility studies, developmental and analytical work, user
tests, and evaluations which directly support the management
functions of the agency. These facilities absorb 25 per
cent of the Federal research and development budget.
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated Organizations
These facilities are effective, in some instances, in





securing competent scientific and technical personnel to
perform research and development work where very complex and
costly facilities are required and government control is
desired. These government, but not wholly in-house, organi-
zations have usually been created to serve new departments
or major entities of the Government which, at the time, do
not have established in-house related facilities. In prac-
tice, this type of organization has been created to provide
a means of rapidly mobilizing talent and facilities to con-
centrate on relatively narrow objectives, usually in fields
new to both the Government and to the civilian economy.
These facilities , together with private profit-making orga-
nizations, utilize 60 per cent of the total Federal budget
for research and development.
University Associated Research Centers
These organizations consist of a laboratory or divi-
sion which has been separately organized by, but remains
legally a part of, a university to handle certain major
government research and development efforts. They are
usually well suited to basic or applied research because the
facilities are so large and expensive that the research
acquires the character of a major program best carried out
in an entity apart from the regular academic organization.
Research in such centers often benefits from the active





time, the sponsoring university (and sometimes other co-
operating universities ) benefits from increased opportuni-
ties for research by its faculties and graduate students.
All research and development conducted by universities
involves 11 per cent of the total budget.
Non-Prof it t Private Foundations
These organizations are non-profit in that there are
no shareholders or investors in the company. They usually
receive all allowable cost-plus fees ("development" or
"general support" allowances). This fee is designed to pro-
vide for operational stability and flexibility and independ-
ent, self-initiated research. These factors are important
for maintaining the cohesiveness and quality of the organi-
zation. If strongly led, these foundations can provide a
degree of independence, both from government and from the
commercial market, which may make them particularly useful
as a source of objective analytical advice and technical
services. They have, on occasion, provided an important
means for establishing a competent research organization for
a particular task more rapidly than could have been possible
within the less flexible administrative requirements of the
Government.





occasioned the greatest controversy. They have frequently
been asked to perform the role of judge or evaluator of the
concepts and components of other organizations. To do this,
it is essential, if they are to play the role impartially,
that they avoid conflicts of interest and that they them-
selves be free from adherence, or appearance of preference,
for particular military services, systems, components or
concepts, including those of their own origination. It is
also necessary that these foundations recognize their own
responsibilities and proper spheres of operations, and the
resulting limitation on their freedom of action. They are
needed as idea-creating or conceptual entities , and as
evaluators of the concepts of others. However, they are not
themselves charged with responsibility for the defense of
the nation or operation of its defensive systems. It is the
Government, through the Military Services, or otherwise,
which must actually defend the nation and, consequently,
must have the responsible and final role in the specifica-
tion of the needed systems, components, and related materi-
als. Similarily, it is the Government which must undertake
actual procurement, test, installation, and evaluation, and,
2United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
Systems Development and Management , Part JL, Hearings

















subsequently, the operation of the defensive systems, and
the like. These organizations must recognize that their
future lies in functions such as "thinkers," planners, or
managers, rather than producers of hardware. The non-profit
foundations absorb approximately 4 per cent of the total
budget.
Colleges and Universities
This unique intellectual environment has proven to be
highly conducive to successful undirected and creative re-
3
search by highly-skilled specialists. Such research is not
amenable to management control by adherence to firm schedules,
well-defined objectives, or predetermined methods of work.
In the college and universities, graduate education and
basic research constitutes an effective means of introducing
future research workers to their fields in direct associa-
tion with experienced people in those fields, and in an
atmosphere of active research work. Applied research appro-
priate to the universities is that which broadly advances
the state-of-the-art.
Private, Profit-Making Organizations
Because of the wide ranging scope of the private,
3United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations , Report to the President on Government Con-
tracting for Research andT'Development , op. cit . , p. 11.
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profit-motivated enterprises, and the consequent diversity
of their staffs, facilities, and fields of technology, the
scope of functions which can be effectively performed by
these organizations is extremely wide. Under the spur of
competition, and since they are able to afford the cream of
the scientist crop, not only do these organizations receive
the largest share of Federal funds for research and develop-
ment, but, consequently, account for the majority of new
developments in science and technology.
II. MANPOWER
Today, in the United States, about one-half million
people are working as scientists, nearly one million as
engineers, one million as technicians, and one-quarter mil-
lion as teachers of science and mathematics in secondary
schools. These numbers refer to persons "working as" scien-
tists, engineers, technicians, or teachers. In the statis-
tics of manpower, persons "trained as" are defined quite
differently and are counted by numbers of academic degrees
awarded in relevant fields. Some persons holding such
degrees are not working in science and technology—and some
persons working in the field do not hold such degrees. For
purposes of this paper, scientists and engineers are persons
engaged in scientific or engineering work requiring knowl-
edge and training equivalent at least to that acquired in a









The nearly two and three-quarter million specialists
working in science and technology account for approximately
3.6 per cent of the civilian labor force. This figure was
about 1.5 per cent in 1940 and is expected to reach 4.7 per
cent in 1970. 4
These persons serve the Nation in many ways : some of
them expand scientific knowledge by doing research; some
apply scientific information and engineering techniques to
develop new products and services, or to solve problems in
health, defense, or transportation; some operate complex
systems for communication or for the exploration of space;
and some educate and train manpower. The Nation's manpower
in science and technology finds employment in each sector of
the country; in colleges and universities, in industry, in
Federal , State and local governments , and in other organiza-
tions.
Manpower Supply and Utilization
Of the total manpower listed above, some four hundred
thousand scientists and engineers in the United States are
engaged in full-time research and development work. A
breakdown of the number of personnel employed by the various
sectors of the Nation is given below.
4National Science Foundation, Profiles of Manpower in
Science and Technology t NSF 62-23 (Washington: Government









SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS BY WORK ACTIVITY

















SOURCE: United States Congress, House of Representa-
tives, Select Committee on Government Research, Manpower for
Research and Development t Study Number II (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 17.
The above table indicates that industry employs ap-
proximately three hundred thousand scientists and engineers
in research and development, while colleges and universities
employ approximately fifty thousand personnel to perform the
same function. The data also reveals that fifty-five thou-
sand scientists and engineers are employed by the Government,
which includes the Federal, State and local governments.
But, although the Federal Government now performs or finances
more than two-thirds of the research and development in the
United States, insofar as the activities can be measured by
expenditures, it cannot be readily determined how many of
the total of scientists and engineers engaged in research





indirectly. What was evident in the testimony before this
Committee was that a critical shortage of manpower is loom-
ing ever larger on the research and development horizon.
For example, it is significant that the number of individuals
capable of performing research and development increases by
only 7 per cent annually, while the annual growth in Federal
research and development expenditures has averaged 15 per
cent. This could also indicate that future Federal pro-
grams may be restricted by the availability of personnel.
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Government Research, Federal Research
and Development Programs , First Progress Report (Washington








FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
EXPENDITURES
One cannot claim that the amount of money a govern-
ment invests in a particular enterprise represents the
degree of power which its professional advocates exert. On
the other hand, there is good reason to believe that spend-
ing levels afford a useful and meaningful indication, if not
a precise measure* The research and development expendi-
tures of all the Federal agencies are important, but
national defense discussions logically center about the pro-
grams of the three agencies which are the largest users of
research and development funds. These three agencies are
the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC). The collective expenditures of these three
agencies now amount to approximately 90 per cent of all the
Federal funds utilized for research and development. A com-
parison of the expenditures for these and other agencies is
presented in Table II.
A brief description of the research and development
functions of these three organizations will be presented in
this chapter, and in order of budget expenditures, their







will be brief in this section, since that department will be
examined in detail in later chapters.
TABLE II
BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(In millions of dollars, for selected years)
Fiscal Year DOD* NASA** AEC Other Total
1955 2,630 74 385 219 3,308
1960 5,654 401 986 697 7,738
1965 7,222 4,900 1,569 1,664 15,355
SOURCE: United States Bureau of the Budget, Federal
Research , Development , and Related Programs , Special Analysis
H (Washington: Government Printing Office, January, 1965),
p. 460.
•Includes Civil Defense
••National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics prior to
1958.
I. BUDGET TRENDS OF MAJOR AGENCIES
Department of Defense
The DOD is currently spending the largest amount of
Federal funds for research and development. Except for two
years (1944-1945) in which the Manhattan project reached its
peak expenditures, it has always been the largest user of
these funds. As might be expected, the major increases have
occurred in times of national crises with the largest in-














conflict. During the more peaceful years, DOD research and
development expenditures have been characterized by rela-
tively modest increases. Even so, the peacetime increases
have been significant dollar amounts when considered in the
light of the expenditures of the other agencies. Total
research and development activities are expected to remain
essentially stable between 1965 and 1966, with no apparent
deterioration in the overall program. The primary defense
research and development programs have been characterized by
the continued effort to develop an anti-ballistic-missile
capability; to perfect an enemy surveillance and detection
system; to improve the antisubmarine warfare capability; and
to improve the command and control system. The military
programs are based on nuclear weapons; on missiles launched
from land, water, and air; on a variety of manned aircraft;
on nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines; and on
early-warning radar networks and satellites.
Major programs in the Defense area, for the past few
years, have been getting just about all the money they can
absorb within the limits of available manpower and contem-
porary scientific knowledge. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, has stated:
The budget is only one guide as to resource limi-
tations. The research and development budget has
been growing over the years at a faster rate than the
supply of trained scientific and engineering manpower.









We are in an era when competent manpower is perhaps a
more limiting factor on operations than is money.
*
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA was created in 1958 and given primary responsi-
bility for research and development in civilian space
efforts. It is now engaged primarily in civilian space
application, but defense space efforts often overlap. For
example, NASA has been granted authority and responsibility
for the development of major boosters for space systems, and
such boosters may have many uses in the future, both civilian
and military.
Parts of the overall space program have been estab-
lished specifically for the civilian aspect. However, a
significant proportion of NASA's activities comes from the
transfer of functions, personnel and facilities from the
previously military-oriented space programs. Hanson Baldwin
points out in a critical view of the space program:
NASA was established by scientific-political pres-
sure groups (with President Eisenhower's approval)
advocating the theory that space efforts must be con-
trolled by civilians and that space must not be used
for military purposes. However, the most important
applications of space technology have been military-
reconnaissance satellites, weather satellites,
missile-warning and navigational satellites.
*
Fremont Ellsworth Kast and James Erwin Rosenzweig
(eds.), Science , Technology and Management (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 53.
2Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow-Down in the Pentagon,"
Foreign Affairs , XLIII (January, 1965), 30.












For Budget Bureau purposes, the entire program of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration is regarded as
research and development. The current expenditures, which
are predicted to stabilize at around five billion dollars
annually, constitutes one-third of all Federal funds allo-
cated for research and development. The primary efforts are
channeled toward developing reliable high-thrust boosters
and guidance and control equipment and techniques; research
in materials, fuels, and behavior of man during space flights;
experiments in communications over interplanetary distances;
development of communications and meteorological satellites;
and development of technology for later, more advanced
flights to the planets.
Two-thirds of fiscal 1965' s spending was scheduled
for a single program: the Apollo moon landing and its re-
lated projects. In President Kennedy's decision regarding
the establishment of a lunar landing mission, the similarity
between the necessity for Presidential decision-making, such
as this and the atomic and hydrogen bomb program, becomes
obvious. In all these cases, the ultimate decision to pur-
sue major technological and scientific goals costing bil-
lions of dollars was made at the topmost governmental level.
The total outlay of Federal funds for space expendi-
tures is expected to exceed $6.6 billion in fiscal year 1966.
Without question, this is the largest single scientific and
H
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technical endeavor ever undertaken by the American people.
Defense Secretary McNamara observes that, "it will influence
the course of science and technology, and, therefore, our
3
national security programs, for decades to come."
Over the four-year period 1961-1965, NASA's budget
has increased by about 500 per cent. The momentum of on-
going programs can now be maintained and new projects
started without further significant increases in the total
budget. This leveling in funds is expected to be realized
by increased requirements in some areas being offset by
reductions in others and by projects passing their funding
peaks are completed, or are terminated. Although there are
many ideas about how new areas should be explored, including
the terminology that will be required if man is ever to fly
to other planets, it is not considered likely that Congress
will be easily talked into another big space effort, outside
4the current budget level, in the next few years.
3
Robert S. McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense
Program and 1966 Defense Budget , United States Congress,
House of Representatives , Armed Services Committee, Testi-
mony (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 135.
The total space expenditures for NASA alone in 1966
is estimated at $5.1 billion, an increase of $200 million
over the 1965 estimate. The greatest increase in 1966 expen-
ditures is in the manned space flight development program,
largely for services and equipment contracted for in prior
years. Expenditures for facilities are estimated to begin
to decline in 1966 as work in major portions of the manned
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Atomic Energy Commission
The research and development program of the AEC, in-
cluding supporting construction, constitutes nearly half of
that organization's total annual expenditures, Basic re-
search is conducted in the physical and life sciences to
secure a better understanding of nuclear processes and of
the effects of nuclear radiation on living organisms. The
AEC's applied research program includes efforts to improve
the processes used in the production of special nuclear
materials, to develop improved types of nuclear weapons, and
to find ways of obtaining useful power from nuclear reactors,
The AEC is responsible for the weapons development test pro-
gram to meet the needs of the Defense Department for new and
improved weapons. The Defense Department is responsible for
weapon effects tests. Again, Baldwin observes:
The political philosophy that nurtured the AEC was
that atom bombs were too powerful to allow the gen-
erals to play with them; ergo, a civilian agency must
control nuclear power—and it must be channeled away
from nasty military purposes. The pragmatic absurdi-
ties of this point of view is now self-evident; nuclear
power so far has been far more important in the mili-
tary weapons and military propulsion field than in any
other way.
5
The DOD-AEC relationship is similar to the DOD-NASA
relationship. Any programs taken together must mesh into a
single, integrated national program; and, if Defense becomes








involved, the project roust hold the distinct promise of en-
hancing military power and effectiveness.
The research and development program in atomic energy
appears to have reached a plateau in financing, with the
possibility that expenditures could begin dropping in the
next few years. Development of new weapons has now been
slowed by the United States-Soviet test ban, and industry is
starting to take over the major role in development of power
reactors. In many other areas where the AEC might turn its
interest, a research program would, in all probability,
7
overlap that of another agency.
National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for
Research , Development , and other Scientific Activities , Vol.
XII, NSF 64-11 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 4.
7A slight decline in 1966 expenditures for the AEC
development programs is expected due to reduced development
in connection with the production of special nuclear ma-
terials and the achievement in 1965, of a readiness capa-
bility to resume atmospheric testing of weapons in the event









DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
INFRASTRUCTURE
Before analyzing today's Defense research and devel-
opment structure, a brief history of the growth of the
organization that has evolved will be presented.
I . BACKGROUND
Prior to World War II, the research and development
activities of the Army and Navy were at an extremely low
level. In 1940, for example, their expenditures were some
thirty million dollars. There was no top-level organization
to coordinate the programs of the two Departments; and, with
the low level of activity, there was a correspondingly small
professional competence in research and development in the
Military Services. This situation was probably an important
factor in the President's creating, in June, 1940, the
National Defense Research Committee—a civilian organization
with authority to initiate, and with funds to support, re-
search and development directed at creating new weapons.
The establishment of this Committee was considered a
constructive and essential step toward an immediate and
effective application of science and technology to the art





funds, the military had done little toward applying science
and technology to warfare and weaponry. But as the possi-
bility of war increased, it was decided that even the
National Defense Research Committee was not sufficient. To
increase the scope of activities, it was superseded by the
Office of Scientific Research and Development in 1941.
Throughout the war, this Office was the top authority and
operating agency of the civilian scientific and technologi-
cal effort. It could initiate research leading to weapons
and carry the developments to the stage of operating models.
But the War and Navy Departments tested and evaluated these
weapons and judged their worth.
The military research and development expenditures
grew to some six hundred million dollars in 1945. A twenty-
fold expansion in a period of five years under war condi-
tions had left little time for efficiency and economy. At
the end of the war, and in conformity with the general and
postwar demobilization of wartime agencies, the Office of
Scientific Research and Development was discontinued in 1946.
Its programs were appropriately assigned for disposition to
the Army and Navy, who had expanded their facilities as the
war had progressed. A Joint Research and Development Board
was organized to coordinate all research and development of
the two Military Departments. With the enactment of the






Department of the Air Force, the task of coordinating the
programs of the then three Military Departments was assigned
to the Research and Development Board created by the same
Act. This Board was made a party of the newly-established
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Research and Development Board was a coordinating
body that operated through a complex organisation of commit-
tees, panels, and subpanels made up of part-time civilian
consultants from academic institutions and industries and of
representatives from the three Services. The usefulness of
the Board was severely restricted due to its limited au-
thority, its size, and its complexity.
By 1953, the research and development expenditures of
the Department of Defense had risen to $1,700,000,000. In
April, 1953, the Rockefeller Committee on Department of
Defense organization recommended that a more effective orga-
nization be created to administer this large program.
In November, 1953, an Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Research and Development) position was created, to be
assisted by a Research and Development Policy Council, in-
ternal coordinating committees, and advisory panels. In
December, 1953, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Applica-
tion Engineering) office was established, with the same
advisory and assisting facilities as the Assistant Secretary.
Operations of these two offices became difficult and confused
II
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because of the interwoven and inseparable nature of their
function. In March, 1957, after attempts had been made for
three years to coordinate, facilitate, and combine functions
of these two offices, Secretary of Defense Wilson merged the
two offices into the single position of Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Research and Engineering).
Meanwhile, the rapid development of missiles had re-
sulted in the creation of a Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense for Guided Missiles. But, in November,
1957, Defense Secretary McElroy felt that the United States
program had gone so far and had so many ramifications that
he changed this Assistant's title to Director of Guided
Missiles. The functions of this office included responsi-
bility for all Department of Defense activities in research,
development, engineering, procurement, and production of
guided missiles.
The launching of Sputnik I by the Russians and the
increasing publicity and claims of inter-service rivalry and
duplication, as well as the cost of missiles and space re-
search, precipitated the creation of the Department of
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in February, 1958.
McElroy decided to concentrate in one organization all the
anti-missile and satellite technology undertaken within the
Defense Department. The head of this Agency reported di-
rectly to the Secretary of Defense and was authorized to






direct such research and de/elopment projects within the
Defense Department as the Secretary designated. Further
authorization was granted to arrange for research and devel-
opment work by other agencies of the Government, and to
enter into contracts for performance of all work required to
accomplish its mission. In practice, the Agency operated
basically in three broad project areas:
1. Those too advanced to be included in specific
service missions;
2. Those of concern to more than one service; and
3. Those which must be handled by an agency not
subordinate to one of the services. 1
By 1958, Defense research and development expendi-
tures had risen to approximately S3 .6 billion, with perhaps
another $1.5 billion research and development-type work in-
cluded in production programs. The many offices, agencies,
and committees (which had been formed) created or permitted
confusion, duplication, lack of overall direction, and
inefficient use of sorely-pressed funds.
President Eisenhower sought to strengthen the control
and supervision of the Secretary of Defense over the crucial
fields of science and technology. Centralized management of
research and development, he believed, would avoid duplica-
tion and prevent gaps in this program. The President
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, "The
Economics of National Security," Research and Development ,
Vol. VIII (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 99.
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proposed that the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering be upgraded to that of a
Director and that the entire effort be placed under its con-
trol. It would be the job of this Director of Defense
Research and Engineering to plan to meet the national mili-
tary objectives instead of the more limited requirements of
each of the Services. Programs which showed no promise or
which were unnecessarily duplicative would be abandoned,
while the promising programs would be released for develop-
2
ment or production.
As a result, on February 10, 1959, the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering position was created to
supersede the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering). Obviously, the functions of this new office
created administrative problems and conflicts with respect
to previously-created offices and agencies. The Director
of Guided Missiles position was dis-established, and the
research and development personnel transferred to the new
Research and Engineering office. The responsibilities of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency were redefined. The
functions were to remain the same, but the Agency-assigned
2United States Congress, House of Representatives,
House Document No. 336, Recommendations Relative to Our
Entire Defense Establishment , President's messageTwashing-




projects were now to be subjected to the supervision and
coordination of the Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering.
A chart depicting the organizational structure of
today's Defense Research and Engineering effort is presented











































































DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
(to the Development Command Level)
SOURCE: Donald W. Coble, "Does DDR&E Overcontrol? ,
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DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
OPERATIONAL PROGRAM
The Defense Department's program for research, devel-
opment, test, and evaluation is concerned with providing
future armed forces with superior weapons and equipment.
The attempt is made to insure against an uncertain future by
continuing to create a foundation of technology, knowledge,
and experience sufficient to provide for contingencies as
they materialize, or are identified. Factors that must be
known to develop these requirements are the national se-
curity policy, the current threat, the potential threat, and
the current state-of-the-art in various technologies, as
well as how each factor is likely to evolve.
Current national security policy guidance is given by
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary
of State. Intelligence agencies provide estimates on what
the threat is or will be. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set
forth the military requirements. Various inputs from the
research and development community reveal levels of the
state-of-the-art available.
Defense expenditures for research and development
have increased approximately three-fold during the last















increased almost five-fold and are estimated to be about
$15.5 billion for fiscal year 1966, or 15 per cent of the
total Administration budget. This is a large sum which
exceeds by several billion dollars the total military expen-
ditures as late as fiscal year 1950. In fact, it is larger
than the gross national products of most of the sovereign
nations of the world.
When the Defense Department allocates resources of
this amount, it has to be mindful of the effect on the
Nation. Consequently, defining the purpose of research and
development programs inevitably carries with it some degree
of influence by non-military and non-scientific factors.
Not necessarily political or regional influences, but rather
such considerations as ensuring existence of an aerospace
industrial base or maximizing civil utilization are the
factors that greatly affect research and development deci-
sions made in the Defense Department.
It is always difficult to stop or redirect an on-
going program that was the result of a decision made in the
past. It is also usually quite expensive. Some sixty major
research and development projects were terminated during the
Robert S. McNamara, The Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense
Program and 1966 Defense Budget . United States Congress,
House of Representatives , Statement before the House Armed
Services Committee (Washington: Government Printing Office,









last ten or twelve years, after costs of well over six bil-
lion dollars had been incurred. Early in 1961, Secretary
McNamara became seriously concerned with the inadequacy of
management disciplines and the attendant poor control over
costs, performance, and schedules in Defense procurement
—
especially in research, development, and early production of
major weapons systems. Cost overruns and schedule slippages
had become the general rule. Large-scale weapon system
developments, and even production programs, had been under-
taken before requirements were clearly defined and before it
had been clearly determined that the technology necessary to
the development existed. All too often, insufficient atten-
tion was paid to how a proposed weapon would be used; what
it would cost; and, finally, whether the contribution the
weapon would make to military capability would be worth the
cost, particularly in comparison with other, possibly com-
peting, weapons.
Under the management techniques which are being im-
plemented, the DOD embarks on a major new weapon system
development only after what is called a pre-project defini-
tion study. This is one of the keys to the curtailment of
the great waste of canceled programs. In the pre-project
definition phase, the DOD, together with contractors, does
the necessary thinking and planning and studying which






assessment of technical risks, and more realistic determina-
tion of estimated costs and time required before a commit-
ment is made to a full-scale development program.
In order to minimize waste and conserve talented
technical manpower, big Engineering Development or Opera-
tional Systems Development projects are required to satisfy
two criteria before being undertaken. irst, the basic
technology required must exist beforehand. Second, the pro-
posed system must be of sufficient prospective military
value to justify, at least, the development cost, and, in
addition, the total systems cost should have a relation to
its expected military value such that it has a fair chance
of becoming part of the operating forces. Also, the total
systems cost, as well as the development costs, should be
understood very early in the program.
Needless to say, some wasted effort cannot be avoided,
in the absence of perfect judgment and an impossible degree
of foresight. There should always be more development pro-
grams underway than ever reach operational use. One reason
for this is that it is desirable to have some insurance
against technical and operational unknowns. Another reason
is that it is often worthwhile to explore competing tech-
nologies. A third reason is to insure against technological




Problems, such as those discussed above, become more
commonplace as a direct result of misguided management
direction and emphasis. In order to insure the development
and proper management of an adequate technological base for
new weapons, it was concluded that there was need for a
departure from the traditional concept of "research and
development" as a single subject. This total field was,
therefore, divided into six broad categories, which, in turn,
highlight the fairly obvious fact that the different cate-
gories of work, which had previously been lumped as "R & D t "
needed quite different management techniques. The resulting
categories modify somewhat the traditional concepts that
were defined in Chapter III and indicate modification to
facilitate application to the weapons system program. The





5. Operational systems development; and
6. Management and support.
All Defense Department research and development projects are




"Hill Knife Poised Over R&D Requests," Armed
Forces Management, X (April, 1964), 29.
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Former Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson once of-
fered the opinion that he did not care "what made the grass
green." The barb was tossed at research for research's sake.
Secretary McNamara evidently takes a slightly different view.
Research is used to describe the effort to achieve a
basic understanding of natural phenomena and environment on
which new ideas for military hardware may be based. Includ-
ing both basic research and applied research directed toward
the expansion of knowledge in various scientific areas, it
represents the cost of developing new knowledge. Research
is not pointed toward the solution of a specific military
problem but does cover scientific areas in which experience
and Judgment leads to beliefs that there is a clear military
potential. The combined research activities enable the DOD
to benefit from the work of the non-government scientific
community engaged in basic research, as well as to support
research activities in in-house laboratories. These latter
in-house efforts maintain an awareness within the Department
of the significance of basic research advances as they per-
tain to future military technology. These bonds are very
important to defense on a long-range basis, as important
advances in military technology in recent years have stemmed
from new results in basic science.
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Research is most frequently done either in govern-
mental laboratories or under cost-reimbursement contracts or
grants with universities and absorbs approximately 5 per
cent of the DOD research and development budget.
Exploratory Development
This category consists of activities directed toward
the solution of specific military problems short of the
development of hardware for experimental or operational
testing. The type of effort varies widely from investiga-
tions of physical phenomena with some application in mind,
through studies, to development of minor components and
3breadboard hardware. These efforts to support the evolu-
tion of ideas will normally be pei formed on a cost-plus-
fixed-fee or incentive basis and receive approximately 15
per cent of the budget.
Advanced Development
This category includes projects which have advanced
to the point where the development of experimental hardware
for technical or operational testing is required, prior to
the determination of whether the item should be designed or
engineered for eventual service use. It is at this stage
3Along with research, this stage forms the pool of
technical knowledge from which future weapons systems will






that each project becomes identified with a specific mili-
tary application or technique, and its potential military
utility is questioned in depth* The costs of the more
likely applications are explored to determine whether the
potential operational benefit would be worth the cost of
development, production, and deployment. Before advancing
to the next category, engineering development, which is the
most costly category of research and development in terms
of returns, the project must undergo the "project definition
phase." As mentioned earlier, it is during this phase that
a proposed weapons system is defined with respect to per-
formance, schedule, and cost. Based on the results of these
findings, an informal decision can be made on whether to
proceed with this system development or, if there are com-
peting systems, which program to select. The process of
objectively defining an undertaking before starting work is
one that makes good sense regardless of the type of task at
hand; however, in the case of the development of modern
weapons systems, it becomes particularly important because
of the great cost involved in such developments.
Actually, most weapon projects add only marginally to
total combat strength; a few notable exceptions are the
atomic and thermonuclear bombs and the Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missile. Therefore, unless the potential payoff













the research and development cycle to reduce the number of
expensive projects that may have to be terminated late in
4the development cycle* The normal expenditures for the
advanced development stage have been averaging approximately
10 per cent of the budget and are usually handled by means
of incentive contracts.
Engineering Development
This category includes the effort directed toward the
development of a particular system engineered for service
use and for operational employment, but which has not yet
been approved for production and deployment. A primary ob-
jective of this stage is to avoid commitment of each advance
in materials or components to a specific weapon system when
such an item should be developed for use by many systems.
Before a project reaches this category, it has undergone the
process whereby, with reasonable precision, a proposed weapon
system is defined with regard to cost effectiveness, goals,
milestones, and time schedules. Engineering development
work is normally contracted for on a fixed price or an in-
centive basis and is allocated approximately 25 per cent of
the budget.
4Patrick W. Powers, A Guide to National Defense (Mew
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964 ) , p. 217.
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Operational Systems Development
The type of work done in this category is the same in
an engineering sense as that done under the category of
"engineering development." It is the effort directed toward
the continued development, test, evaluation, and design im-
provement of projects which have already entered (or have
been approved for) the production-development stage. This
category normally consumes approximately 30 per cent of the
budget. Contracts for systems development are on a fixed-
price or incentive basis and may not be negotiated on a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract arrangement.
Management and Support
The final category groups together the effort in
general support of the research, development, test, and
evaluation program. It, thus, includes maintenance and
overhead costs of the national ranges, such as the Atlantic,
Pacific, and White Sands Missile Ranges. It also provides
civilian manpower, technical materials and contractor assist*
ance required for management and operation of the research
and development organization. This category is normally
allocated approximately 15 per cent of the budget.
In Research and in Exploratory Development , no con-
straints are placed on the extent of scientific and tech-
nology advancement which is hoped will be achieved. The













of creativity causes inherent high technical risks with an
expected high potential for failure. This work frequently
requires long-term continuity without deadlines. It is
essential that there be a high level of activity in these
fields and duplicate efforts are frequently desirable. Much
of this work is undertaken without regard to specific de-
fense objectives and without government funding.
There has never been any argument about the need for
sustaining the flow of new technology. Indeed, since 1961,
steps have been taken to assure greater support of research
and exploratory development, which are the foundations of
new technology. In the DOD, the outlay for research and
exploratory development has approached the $1.5 billion
mark. This $1.5 billion-plus is spent for projects which
are not required to have a detailed justification in terms
of end use before approval. On the contrary, usually, fund
research is planned on a level of effort basis, and it is
only asked that general relevance be attained in exploratory
development. Naturally good technical quality is desired in
both areas, but the policy of attempting to create an en-
vironment conducive to creative work automatically inhibits
overly-detailed management.
Advanced Developments are considered high risk be-
cause of the impossibility of predicting the degree of












technical suitability at this stage. Hence, here also,
there is frequently a need for multiple developments. There
is an expected high rate of attrition among the multiple
approaches in favor of one or more most suitable to enter
future engineering development. Work in this field is also
frequently undertaken without specific defense direction and
without Government funding. It is highly desirable that the
Government have an open door to consider, and use, and pro-
tect contractor innovations in development in this category.
To keep this door open, these private innovations must con-
tinue to be protected.
Six hundred million dollars in the Advanced Develop-
ment category are currently earmarked for innovations in
experimental hardware. This money is intended for hardware
developments which might evolve into large systems. About
half of this is required to pass the test of good probability
of evolution into new military systems. Thus, overall,
nearly two billion dollars a year, in the Department of
Defense are not subjected to the test of a high probability
of immediate or clearly-foreseeable utility. That is not a
paltry effort in the advancement of research and technology.
It is, in fact, the greatest amount in the history of De-
fense research and development.
During Engineering and Operational Systems Develop-







which has been determined feasible either in laboratory or
other experimental form. While the technical risk is con-
sidered relatively low, there is some risk inherent in the
assumption that laboratory quantitative results can be
engineered into final equipment. In short, it is from the
first three categories—Research, Exploratory, and Advanced
Development—that are acquired the "technical building
blocks," i.e., the new technologies, process, materials, and
critical components, that are needed for major systems
development. A proper Job of engineering development, or
operational systems development, cannot be done unless these
building blocks are available. Lack of attention to this
principle and the resultant necessity to abandon large
development projects on the ground of infeasibility have, in
the past, been a major cause of unnecessary expense in
development programs. While research and exploratory devel-
opment does not necessarily have to be directly related to
specific military requirements, a full-scale engineering or
operational systems development can be justified only in
terms of its potential contribution to a strategy, consider-
ing both its cost and its military effectiveness, as well as
the relative cost effectiveness of other alternatives.
Fiscal year 1965 funding for the six categories de-
fined above is presented for the four user activities of the




DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1965
(in millions of dollars, rounded off)
Development
















1,127 598 1,653 1,580 1,057
SOURCE: James Camp Trainor, "Defense Research and
Engineering: Annual Military Systems Review," Missiles and
Rockets, XIV (March 30, 1964), 102-3.









DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: ORGANIZATION
The authority for the establishment of the position
of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is
contained in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, He is
to be a civilian appointed by the President and has preced-
ence in the Defense Department immediately following the
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
the Service Secretaries. Currently serving as the DDR&E is
Dr. Harold Brown. Dr. Brown was born in New York City in
1927, and received his doctorate in physics from Columbia
University. He has taught physics at Stevens Institute of
Technology, served as Deputy Director of the Lawrence Radia-
tion Laboratory at Livermore in 1950, and as Director in
1960. He has served on the President's Science Advisory
Committee since 1958. Dr. Brown also served as senior
science adviser to the United States delegation on nuclear
testing in Geneva from 1958 to 1959. His fields are nuclear
physics, reactor design, nuclear explosions, and weapons
systems. He was appointed by President Kennedy to his
present position in March of 1961. Dr. Brown has recently
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Government Research, Federal Research
and Development Programs , Hearings (Washington: Government










been named as prospective Secretary of the Air Force, to
become effective on October 1, 1965.
I. DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
Functions
The duties of the DDR&E are listed in three broad
categories as follows:
1. To be the principal adviser to the Secretary of
Defense on scientific and technical matters;
2. To supervise all research and engineering activi-
ties in the Department of Defense; and
3. To direct and control (including their assignment
or reassignment) research and engineering ac-
tivities that the Secretary of Defense deems to
require centralized management.
2
The first function consists principally of giving the
Secretary of Defense scientific and technical information,
advice, and recommendations on broad problems that often in-
clude many other important facets in addition to the tech-
nical ones. In this category, the proper technical
qualifications speak well for his professional knowledge,
Hanson Baldwin observes that "in his new political role in
the Pentagon, he has become a remarkably unadventurous sci-
entist." Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow-Down in the Pentagon,"
Foreign Affairs , XLIII (January, 1965), p. 267.
2He could also assign a new weapons system, regardless
of which service might have developed it, to any of the three
Armed Services for production, procurement, and operational
control. Harry Howe Ranson, Can Democracy Survive Did War ?





questions concern the estimated technical performance of the
systems and their potential for improvement, the validity of
cost and time estimates for completion of development, and
estimates on the development of possible weapons to counter
or neutralize the effectiveness of the system, or comparison
of capabilities with other systems. In his testimony to the
House Committee on Government Operations on July 23, 1962,
Dr. Brown stated:
Questions of the military usefulness of the weapon,
the political and psychological implications of having
it or not having it and whether the country could
afford it, are not matters of technical advice. While
I may and usually do have opinions on some of these
matters, I regard it as my responsibility not to con-
fuse these opinions on non-technical matters with
advice or opinions.
^
The supervisory function is that of managing the re-
search, development, test, and evaluation programs within
the Defense Department. This function is one that has its
impact on the Military Departments and the actual research
and development projects being performed. The authority
here is to approve, modify, or disapprove research and
development projects and programs of the Military Depart-
ments, and other Defense agencies; to eliminate unpromising
or unnecessary duplicative programs, and to initiate or
3United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
Systems Development and Management , Part 2, Hearings





support promising ones. The formal overall procedures and
techniques for screening and approving major development
projects or groups of projects are related to a five-year
program package concept. The DDR&E and the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller) work closely in developing and
refining the technique for screening and approving major
projects and, Baldwin claims that, "any projected weapons
system has to run the gauntlet between the Scylla of Dr.
4Brown and the Charybdis of Mr. Hitch." The authority, of
course, is derived from the Secretary of Defense and in
problems of major importance, the DDR&E actions are in the
form of recommendations to him.
The last function, the direction and control of re-
search and engineering activities deemed to require central-
ized management, is the function that is carried out through
the operations of the Advanced Research Projects Agency,
which reports directly to the DDR&E. A Weapons System
Evaluation Group is also assigned to the administrative con-
trol of the DDR&E and is supported by the Institute for
Defense Analysis. These groups provide operations analyses
of weapons systems to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
DDR&E, and to other components of the Office of the Secretary
4









of Defense. All three subsidiary organizations will be dis-
cussed in detail later in this paper.
The missions of the DDR&E office can be summarized as
ensuring that:
1. A technological base is available for current
developments and is replenished for future ones
that may be needed later as national purposes
and strategies evolve; and to establish maximum
carry-over of technicians to the civilian
sector of the United States economy,
2. A balance is struck in the allocation of resources
within the sometimes conflicting requirements
of dollar limitations, military needs, impact
on civilian economy and other demands on strate-
gies.
3. Planning of the research and development program
as a whole and adherence to the plan is firm
enough to minimize uncertainty in the budgetary
process in the Military Departments and in the
defined industry, but flexible enough to accom-
modate desirable changes.
4. Developments are pursued which will result in
military systems that best support the purposes
and strategies of the United States and its
allies, as distinguished from development which,
while technologically feasible or otherwise
attractive, may be of limited worth.
5. Individual projects are planned and controlled in
relation to the plan so that military systems
are operationally available when needed, with
the desired performance and within the intended
costs.
The ideas for new research and development can come
from any individual or organization, civilian or military j if
the resulting proposals fulfill any military requirement or
defense research objective, they may become identified with
a specific project. There is no established or rigid pat-












management of the development is carefully monitored within
the Defense Department so that the program objectives can be
fully met.
The importance of assigning the best possible person-
nel as managers of research and development programs cannot
be overemphasized. The present procedure under which mili-
tary officers are given such an assignment in the normal
rotation process, without enough consideration of each man's
qualifications for the position, has recently been criti-
cized by the House of Representatives Committee on Appropria-
5tions. This committee expressed concern that the above
procedure could lead to the man assigned merely becoming a
figurehead with a civilian deputy actually managing the pro-
gram. It questioned the need for the manager of a project
being a military man in order to give the program the desired
input of professional military experience if this same input
could be derived from a lesser position of authority. If
the Defense Department cannot improve their present policy
regarding the rotation of military personnel, it was recom-
mended that more development programs be managed by civilian
personnel who can stay on the job until it is finished.
5United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Bill
, 1966 , Report (Washington: Government Printing
0ffice7"T565Tr"p. 45.
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Since the assignment of the responsibility for a program is
often impossible under a system in which managers are fre-
quently reassigned, with the subsequent problems of fixing
responsibility, effective management becomes an almost im-
possible task. While the DDR&E is the Defense agency pri-
marily responsible for the program, the above conclusion is
particularly applicable to the staff of operational organi-
zations in each of the three Services. A resume of the
organizational concept of these three Services will be pre-
sented to investigate the principles employed to attempt to
achieve the desired managerial control.
II. ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The role of the Army in national defense has under-
gone an important change within the past several years.
Following the development of the atomic bomb and thermo-
nuclear weapons, national security was based primarily on
the concept of massive retaliation. This approach led to a
downgrading in the size and mission of the Army's forces and
placed greater reliance on large-scale systems of strategic
deterrence, utilizing aircraft and missiles. However, in
recent years, the national security policy has changed with
the recognition of a need for effective and mobile forces to
deal with a variety of conflict situations ranging from
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reemphasized the Army's mission, one geared to conflict at
less than a massive global level. For weapon system acqui-
sitors, the Army has continued to adhere to the arsenal
concept, maintaining strong in-house technical and mana-
gerial capabilities.
In the most recent reorganization of the Army, the
Army Material Command was established to integrate the
material functions, and is similar to adaptations which have
taken place in the other Services. The Army has maintained
strong centralization over the managerial functions with
emphasis lying in the rise of vertical project management.
Limited delegation to private industry is the rule, and in
those instances where outside private contractors have been
utilized for technical or systems advice, these facilities
have remained in a definite staff capacity with no direction
over other contractors. When there has been a question of a
lack of manpower to meet total needs, the Army generally
maintains the more complex and advanced programs for in-
house effort and has contracted out the more standardized
programs. This approach is followed to ensure an advanced
state-of-the-art for in-house capabilities.
Fremont Ellsworth Kast and James Erwin Rosenzweig
(eds.), cience , Technology and Management (New York:








III. NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The mission and role of the Navy also have undergone
significant changes in the past several decades. The Navy
had long been considered the Nation 1 s "first line of defense"
against conventional warfare. With the development of nu-
clear capabilities by potential enemies, this role was
diminished somewhat. The importance of the Navy's mobility
in meeting limited war conditions has since been emphasized.
Experience in Korea, the Formosa Straits, and now in Vietnam
supports the importance of this role and, particularly, the
carrier task force as an instrument of limited war capability.
However, it took a revolutionary new development to
change the Navy's basic mission. The development of the
Polaris, the Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile system, provided
the Navy with a new weapon of strategic importance. It has
become an integral part of the total system of strategic
deterrence. The Polaris program also represents one of the
major weapon systems development of today, comparable in
size and scope, and perhaps greater in cost than the atomic
or hydrogen bomb programs.
The Navy has made major adjustments in its pattern of
organization structure in order to provide for the perform-
ance of functions under an integrated systems management
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led to the merging of two of the major Navy Bureaus, the
Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Aeronautics, into a
Bureau of Naval Weapons in mid-1959.
In its Office of Naval Research, the Navy adjusted
its internal managerial structure to provide for coordina-
tion of the various functional activities. This was done
through the lead-bureau concept or by the establishment of a
separate agency for managerial and technical integration,
such as the Special Projects Office for the Fleet Ballistic
system. Under these arrangements, the lead-bureau or spe-
cial office is given over-all responsibility for weapons
system management.
The Navy has made extensive use of outside contractors
for technical direction on a staff advisory basis with
limited authority over other contractors. It has maintained
fairly strong central control and in-house authority, with
limited delegation of the systems management functions to
private enterprise. In the areas of research, development,
test, and evaluation, the Navy continues to provide strong
7in-house capability.
IV. AIR FORCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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revolutionized modern warfare. The atomic and hydrogen
bombs provided strategic weapons of momentous proportions,
and the Air Force was assigned the role of conveying these
weapons. The national policy of a nuclear deterrent gave a
prime role to the Strategic Air Command and the development
of such weapon systems as the B-4 7, the B-52, and the B-58.
As ballistic missiles became a growing part of the strategic
arsenal, the Air Force also was assigned major responsi-
bility for their development and utilization.
The Air Force stresses the weapon system concept and
has moved in the direction of systematic integration. Early
in 1961, two steps were taken that represented a major
change for the Air Force. On March 6, 1961, Secretary of
Defense McNamara issued a Directive "Development of Space
Systems," that outlined the responsibility of the various
Services in the military portion of the national space pro-
gram. Specifically, this directive assigned the Air Force
the responsibility for research, development, testing and
a
engineering of the Department of Defense space programs.
In effect, this directive made the Air Force the systems
manager for the military space program. However, this direc-
tive left the door open for other military agencies to
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Science and Astronautics, Military Astronautics ,












engage in preliminary research and to develop new ways of
using space technology. Those functions performed for mili-
tary space systems by the Air Force are complementary to the
Nation's civilian space exploration efforts, which are the
prime responsibilities of NASA.
To facilitate implementation of this newly-assigned
responsibility for management of the military space program
and to coordinate with NASA as well as with the Army and the
Navy, the Air Force undertook a sweeping reorganization
—
another evolutionary step toward integrated systems manage-
ment. Basically, the Air Force concentrated development and
procurement of all systems—space, aeronautical, electronic,
and ballistic—into a single command, the Air Force Systems
Command. This concentration under a single head facilitated
technical integration and management control. The Systems
Command is organized to provide the most up-to-date and
effective management of Air Force scientific and technical
resources, and is the single manager of all aspects of acqui-
sition of weapon and related equipment from research and
development through procurement.
The Air Force has traditionally delegated more respon-
sibility for design and engineering to private industry than
have the other two Services. Under its weapons system con-
cept, it has delegated broad responsibilities to industry.
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technical direction and systems-integration responsibility.
It also utilizes separate contractors, such as Space Tech-
nology Laboratories and Aerospace Corporation for systems
integration and technical direction. Recently, the Air
Force has been stressing the importance of in-house capacity,
particularly central planning and direction for the various
laboratories for weapons system management, by establishing
a research and technology division within the Air Force
9Systems Command.








DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
SUBSIDIARY ORGANIZATIONS
William Kaufmann observes in his book, The McNamara
Strategy
,
McNamara brought about two major revolutions within
the DOD* He redesigned the military strategy and
forces of the United States and at the same time he
installed an entirely new method of making decisions
within the Pentagon* *
The 1963 budget for the military functions of the DOD was
the first to be developed under the procedures introduced by
the McNamara regime* No longer would the Defense budget be
split according to Service requirements but instead be
divided up among nine program packages, one of which is
Research and Development* Each package contains those mili-
tary programs which contribute to the same function irre-
spective of their particular Service alliance* The new
procedure, which represents the largest step toward the uni-
fication of the Armed Forces since the National Security Act
of 1947, also features five-year cost projections, measure-
ment of all input costs based upon systems analysis, and
William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964), p. 3*
Ml WmJJ Mil tftd ,rs r.v- Mfc}£:i< ::.: ' . iv ' aad *C a»iVio3;
arnolcl:: w n* bsIIadaoJt
i tw
SAW 'Iff &A3
td J-'' pftM1 MJIfflff* lid bluo* :-v:vf:C OM »MUfc|Mtii MUMB#KqM MM
.?..: bgffiinF dlld fe*Oa | I 1 ; . .• • .. y^.VT.,c Cd r>nJLt-loo3i tJtl^l
pnoauft q« babJtvlb
- b aaortd a/utad ../,•:..•: C*vafl Iffi /isuMitfl
-Sail 80WX&O j»^
~lnu *»ii.l biftwod qada ias « , a^irbaoooq
doA ^diii/oafi IfinoldaM arid aofii* au haoli
-^^,'ejiein % *nol$oeloiq iaoa laeY-evl) «r>:a/d&*"i oal* /w^i *o
.* , si avian* affttdaya : lie *o dn»a
•t . Jl baa *aq~
86
estimates of the relative worth of each program and its ele-
2
ments in achieving national defense objectives,
A Project Definition Directive issued in March, 1964,
outlined the stringent prerequisites future weapons systems
would have to meet. Specifically, DDR&E insisted that
before a systems development program is initiated the tech-
nology must be proven. All major unknowns, such as compo-
nents, sub-systems, costs, schedules, and reporting
procedures will have been eliminated, insofar as possible
before development is approved. Concurrency, except in the
rare case of preeminent national defense interest, has been
rejected as a method of development.
A second, no less major change is that newness per se
is not a criterion for development. The contribution of a
proposed weapons system to over-all national defense must be
clearly demonstrable, and it must be proven beyond dispute
that the job cannot be done by a system already in the in-
ventory.
DDR&E is also concerned with its communication with
private industry. In past relationships, industry was in-
fluenced by the wishes of the Services, rather than the hard,
definable direction that military technology was taking.
2Harry C. White and Robert J. Massey, "Program
Packaging: Opportunity and Peril," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings , LXXXVII (December, 1961), 28.
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The recommendation that has been advanced is that industry
should tell the military what it needs! More specifically,
OOR&E feels that defense-oriented firms are in a unique
position to tell the Services what the state-of-the-art is
and what, therefore, the military can reasonably ask for.
How are decisions and recommendations, such as these,
made; To answer this question, a look at the workings of
DDR&E is in order. Since March 1, 1964, the programs which
DDR&E have concerned themselves with are grouped into five
3
areas, each headed by a Deputy Director. This organiza-
tion, including both the Weapons System Evaluation Group and
the Advanced Research Projects Agency is staffed by 180 pro-
fessional civilians, 153 military technicians, and 228
clerks, both civilian and military. Although Deputy Direc-
tors have been named for each of the major areas of DDR&E
concern, projects are assigned on an individual basis rather
than by any rigid adherence to an organization chart. DDR&E
is designed to work informally. There are frequent meetings
with Service counterparts and working drafts of memoranda
are prepared by the Services so that once the language is
fully worked out, the papers can be sent to DDR&E with some
assurance that they will be accepted. An attempt is being
made to change from the pre-Brown DDR&E when the Services
3See organization chart, supra
, p. 57.
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would submit a paper only to have it bounce back for some
minor change in language; there was no assurance that once
this was corrected, the correspondence would not be returned
again • The review-and-approval cycle in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense had been described by all three Mili-
tary Services as having the "yo-yo" effect. A new idea was
sent up the line to DDR&E, who reviewed it in some detail as
the contributor had. Frequently, DDR&E would ask the con-
tributor to do some more homework on the idea; the additional
4
work was done—and the cycle sometimes repeated iftself
.
Since DDR&E cannot control the Military research and
development effort in detail, it tries to control the envir-
onment within which that program must work. The tendency is
to take care of emergencies, either the very big programs or
the ones that either DDR&E, Congress, or the President con-
siders very important, or the ones that are in trouble. The
goal is to set up clear-cut procedures within which the
Services can make decisions. By periodic program reviews,
the over-all content of the research and development effort
can be controlled. There are two major reviews each year.
The first is the submission of the program and supporting
information for the coming year's budget. The next review
4Defense Science Board, Subcommittee on Defense Con-
tractor Effort, Encouragement of Innovation t Report (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 9.
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takes place after Congress acts on the research, development,
test, and evaluation program; it requires the Services to
support their requested allocation of funds before they are
released. The DDR&E staff reviews these program plans and
the funding requests and recommends action to Dr. Brown,
who, in turn, makes recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense. Through change proposals, by which any major com-
ponent of the DOD may alter its proposed program, reviews
of technical development plans, and liaison with the Mili-
tary Services and their contractors, the Staff maintains
5
continuous review of the research and development programs.
Under existing procedures, the personnel of the
Office of DDR&E must assume too often a primarily negative
role in their review of proposals of the Military Services.
It seems reasonable that with the existing negative roll of
the Comptroller's office, DDR&E could undertake a more
active part in expediting the successful completion of ap-
proved development programs. The lengthy testing and
evaluation procedures now employed by the Military Services
,
coupled with the ever-present reluctance of engineers and
technicians to stop attempting to make "just one more"
refinement in a system, could tend to reduce the chances of
5Wesley W. Posvar, et al., (eds.), American Defense









operational systems possessing the qualities of available
technology.
It also seems reasonable to expect that military
research and development programs which have been funded in
amounts of between $6.5 and $7 billion for several years
should provide significant new weapons and equipment. While
new items have recently been added to the Inventory, the
quantity and quality of these systems are hard pressed to
justify the massive effort being funded. The management
tools instituted by the DOD may not stifle the development
of new programs, as has been alleged, but it can be argued
that a sufficient number of new programs of major importance
have not been forthcoming. The DOD is, therefore, under
constant pressure to institute procedures designed to maxi-
mize the deployment of new and better weapons and equipment
with the operating forces.
Apart from the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Dr.
Brown has no line authority over the research and develop-
ment efforts of the Services. His is primarily a staff
function of recommending courses of action to the Secretary
of Defense. However, his influence, both in this role and
in actions delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense is
not inconsiderable. He has stirred up considerable furor in
the Pentagon by increasingly giving the Services what he














and even more detailed instructions on how they should con-
duct their research. In spreading out into the operational
area, his office has, in the case of the TFX, gone so far as
to lay out specifications and performance characteristics of
the new weapon system. The Military objects to his advice by
saying: "How do you know what kind of a plane we want? You
have not flown in combat. We have, and we know what we
need." Brown's usual rejoinder comes back like this:
The qualification this gives you is to say what
characteristics are best in an airplane, not what is
to be done to obtain them. Military requirements
must be cast in terms of, "If technology allows so-
and-so to happen, we want it to do this"; it should
not be cast in terms of, "This is how to achieve
such-and-such characteristics. "6
How to get technology to allow so-and-so and how to recog-
nize it is accomplished by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG)
,
and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Each of these
subsidiary organizations will be analyzed separately in the
remainder of this chapter.
I. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
ARPA celebrated its eighth year of existence in
February, 1965, and the adult looks very little like the
1963), 47.







infant. This agency, which once handled the DOD»s space
7programs and was very hardware oriented has turned into a
rather scholarly organization which brings a somewhat more
basic research approach to most of the vital defense ques-
tions facing the nation. With an authorized staff of
sixty-eight professional civilians, fifty-six military tech-
nicians, and sixty-three clerks, civilian and military, ARPA
exercises the functions of directing and controlling line
operations. ARPA is responsible for the basic and applied
research and development in such advanced projects as are
assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by DDR&E, and
utilizes military departments, other government agencies,
industrial and commercial facilities, individuals, and edu-
8
cational or research institutions to carry out its projects.
Generally, an assignment to ARPA results from a decision
that centralized management of a program in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense is desirable or from a determina-
tion that the contemplated research is not peculiar to one
Service or identified with a specific category of military
systems. This agency provides the Secretary of Defense with
a full-time, quickly-responsive, highly-competent technical
7The three broad project areas are listed supra , p. 54.
QPatrick W. Powers, A Guide to National Defense (New
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and managerial body to direct and accelerate high priority
military research which requires close attention at the
9Secretary of Defense level. The goal of most projects is
to determine the feasibility of a technique or of a system.
Once this feasibility is established, the projects are
usually transferred to one or more of the Military Depart-
ments to continue the development and exploitation of the
results of ARPA's research.
Research areas in which ARPA has current responsi-
bility are:
*• Ballistic Missile Defense . Also called Project
DEFENDER, this area absorbs nearly half of the
ARPA annual budget and involves the efforts of
about 25 per cent of the technical personnel.
This project is concerned with the scientific
and technical knowledge needed for the design
of the United States defenses against ballistic
missiles and satellites, and for the assessment
of the ability of the United States ballistic
missile systems to penetrate enemy defenses.
2 * Nuclear Test Detection . Referred to as Project
VELA, this program calls for ARPA to conduct
research, development and systems design to
improve United States capability to detect,
identify, locate and verify the occurrence of
nuclear blasts in space, the atmosphere, under-
ground or underwater.
3 » Remote Area Conflict . This program, commonly
called Project AGILE, is founded on the thesis
9After DDR&E, ARPA is perhaps most directly affected
by the decisions of the Presidents Scientific Advisory
Committee . James Camp Trainor, "Defense Research and
Engineering: Annual Military Systems Review," Missiles and











that remote area warfare is controlled in a
major way by the environment in which it
occurs. It is designed to support the solution
of remote area conflict problems with primary
emphasis on requirements of indigenous forces
in guerrilla warfare situations.
4# Behavioral Sciences . Known as Project CARINA,
this program is almost exclusively basic re-
search conducted by universities and non-profit
corporations. Research is supported in the
areas of human performance, motivation, and
teaching and learning.
5. Information Processing Techniques . A project
designed to increase the usefulness and effec-
tiveness of digital information processing.
6. Energy Conversion . This program includes a look
at fuel cells, magneto-hydrodynamics , thermo-
chemistry and the like, for possible ground and
satellite use. ARPA has supported research in
this area, but subsequent to fiscal year 1965,
the Services will follow up this work and will
be solely responsible for the funding of re-
search in energy conversion in the DOD.
7. Propellant Chemistry . In this program, called
Project PRINCIPIA, ARPA conducted research in
the discovery and development of new high energy
chemical propellants. Reaching the theoretical
limits in a number of propellants, both solid
and storable liquid, the next step is to
harvest this information for practical use.
This work is now being divided up among the
individual Military Services.
8 - Material Sciences . Named Project PONTUS, this
program consists of basic research in materials.
The major effort is conducted in twelve civilian
universities
.
Except as noted above, these programs will probably
remain with ARPA for several years, although there are con-
stant changes within the programs themselves. A continual
analysis of current programs provides the basis for deciding
H




which projects have reached the state where they can be
farmed out. The character of ARPA demands that completed
programs be terminated, in order to allow the assumption of
new projects,
II. WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
Although operations research was active prior to
World War II, it was not until the war that it r«ftlli proved
effective. James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense,
found that he was presented with problems the Military was
not qualified to solve
—
primarily in the fields of applying
technology to military adaptation. To insure a capability
for impartial evaluation of weapons systems, he created, in
December, 1948, the WSEG. Today, this Group is staffed by
two professional civilians, fifty-four military technicians,
and fifty-one clerks, civilian and military. The WSEG pro-
vides comprehensive, objective, and independent analysis and
evaluation of weapon systems under projected conditions of
war. It studies present and future weapons systems, their
influence on strategy, organization, and tactics, and their
comparative effectiveness and cost. In other words, the
WSEG brings together the proposed weapons and the proposed
employment to see if they will be effective for the type of
warfare predicted for the future. This is called an "opera-











factors that cannot accurately be determined. It can,
through the use of rapid computing techniques, be used to
determine the critical characteristics of weapons and ma-
teriel that best meet future needs.
The importance of the WSEG lies in its unique combina-
tion of experienced military officers working next to ex-
perienced academicians within the DOD. The WSEG»s position
within the Defense establishment is a valuable asset also.
In conducting a study, the Group can call for—and get-
information from any of the Services or any of the Defense
agencies. Intellectually, the Weapons System Evaluation
Division (WSED) of the Institute for Defense Analysis, is an
integral part of the WSEG. It is co-located with the DOD
organization and the two groups work side-by-side in many
instances. The military officers of the WSEG are assigned
to various projects, usually two to a project, and work with
the WSED staff.
Although the WSEG is under the surveillance and di-
rection of the DDR&E Chief, Dr. Brown, its study requirements
can come from DDR&3 or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or from
the Secretary of Defense himself. These studies vary in
size and requirements, ranging from a rather brief month-
long exercise to a continuing survey of particular areas, such
Powers, op. cit
. , p. 215.
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as the state-of-the-art in Lasers. Generally speaking, they
involve systems analysis and operations research into the
merits of weapon systems or competing weapons with respect
to operational use, relative costs, effectiveness, and limi-
tations.
One of the main rewards of working for the WSEG/WSED
is that the papers, studies, and verbal information the
organizations are asked to prepare are transmitted quickly
to the top levels of the Defense establishment, where they
could carry considerable authority.
III. INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS
IDA was born in 1955, when Defense Secretary Charles
E. Wilson asked the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) to take on the civilian staffing for the Pentagon's
WSEG. Civil Service had been inadequate for the task of
supplying the scientific knowledge required by that Group.
MIT felt the task was not one for a university, but agreed
to join with other universities to sponsor a private, non-
profit corporation to furnish professional service to the
WSEG. The California Institute of Technology, Case Insti-
tute, Stanford, and Tulane joined MIT, and set up IDA with a
$500,000 Ford Foundation grant as initial working capital.





Michigan, Pennsylvania State, Illinois, and Princeton. The
objectives of IDA are three-fold:
1. To enable and assist the academic community in
placing its resources in relevant, effective
and contributing apposition to the Government;
2. To build the competence of this new science of
Operations Research by increasing the number of
people engaged in it and by developing the
skills thus exercised; and
3. To transmit to the Nation generally, throu
channels of teaching and communication, a
sharpened appreciation of the real and present
problems of preserving the national security.
Originally established in connection with the evalua-
tion of competing weapons systems, the scope of the Insti-
tute now encompasses broad areas of military strategy where
the support for judgments on weapons evaluation i3 often
found. It even would appear that now the close connection
with strategic issues has been the link that has extended
research on military operations into the far reaches of
national policy.
The largest and still major contract of IDA is to
provide technical support and studies to the WSEG. The
second major task that IDA took on historically was to pro-
vide support for ARPA when it was founded. Mr. Richard M.
Bissell, Jr., President of IDA, admitted In 1962 that since
ARPA, in a sense, has been subsumed under DDR&E, IDA v/as now






as for ARPA. At that time, IDA employed 226 professional
employees and some 141 non-professionals. IDA«s current
contracts add up to approximately ten million dollars,
IDA now has four other divisions : Research and
Engineering Support, International Studies, Communications
Research, and Jason. The Research and Engineering Division
is under contract to DDR&E for technical studies of the
physical sciences and engineering of such depth as to be
unsuited for the WSEG. By design, this Group is composed of
senior scientists, who function as "intimate" consultants to
12the DDR&E. The International Studies Group has done
studies for the State Department and for the Arms Control
Agency. The Communications Division, located on the Prince-
ton campus, does classified research in the area of elec-
tronics for the DOD. Jason represents one of the most
interesting activities of IDA. This group was created as a
consequence of a belief on the part of older scientists that
the younger generation was not being exposed to the key un-
solved problems of the Nation's defense. Basically, the
group, consisting of twenty-five to thirty young scientists,
meets for about six weeks each summer to be exposed to
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Operations, Systems Development
and Management , Hearings (Washington: government Printing
Office,
, te 5, p. 618.
12Trainor, op. cit
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defense problems. They are accorded the widest need-to-know
and are briefed by the three Services, DDR&E, and the major
agencies of the Government. After that, they are free to
form work teams, think about these problems and research
them.
The organization chart presented on the following
page illustrates the relationship of the DDR&E and IDA, as
well as WSEG and WSED.
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RELATIONSHIP OF DDR&E AND IDA, AND WSEG AND WSED
SOURCE: "Weapons Systems Evaluation Group," Armed







DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
DATA UTILIZATION
The preceding chapters have described the organiza-
tions established for the conduct of research and develop-
ment within the Defense structure. Obviously, this effort
would be wasted if data on the results achieved were not
either passed on and utilized by policy-mekers or made
available to other organizations that would benefit from
knowledge of this information. Scientific and technical
information is both a principal ingredient and a major prod-
uct of research and development. As science and technology
have expanded, so hava the volume and con.pleaity of the
interchange of scientific information. The Defense Depart-
ment recognizes that as a major sponsor cf the Nation's
research and development effort, it also bears the collat-
eral responsibility to assure that the fruits of such
endeavor are made available to the scientific community and
others.
I. DOCUMENTATION CONTROL REORGANIZATION
Defense Documentation Center
In 1955, the Armed Services Technical Information








This agency was the control depository for the DOD research,
development, test, and evaluation activities. Recently, the
responsibility for management control of scientific informa-
tion has been assigned to the DDR&E. The old agency was
given a new name, a new home, and completely revamped. The
Armed Services Technical Information Agency was redesignated
as the Defense Documentation Center to reflect more pre-
cisely its mission and functions. The Defense Documentation
Center for scientific and technical information was trans-
ferred to the Defense Supply Agency at DDR&£ initiative
which is deemed an all-around improvement. Not only has the
scope of document collection been expanded to include
restricted-data documents, but the Center has also been
assigned the functions of maintaining a clearinghouse index
of current research development, test ane evaluation pro-
grams within the Departnent as well as establishing a cen-
tralized directory and referral service on scientific and
technical information activities.. Since the Defense Supply
Agency is responsible directly to the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, the channels oi communication between
policy and operations axe drawn much closer with the new
arrangement.
A new automated system has been initiated to make
information more readily available which should reduce un-
necessary duplication in research and exploratory
£01
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development. Called the Research and Technology Resume, it
will be utilized for reporting progress on current projects.
These reports are prepared in a standard digital language
which permits their rapid and proficient interchange among
Military Services and Defense agencies, and, by special
agreement, with NASA.
The Defense Documentation Center receives, stores,
and disseminates information emanating from the Defense
Department, other governmental laboratories, and from indus-
try. Some analytical work is done within this organization
to help people understand certain information better, but
the whole process is a difficult job because of the tremen-
dous number of documents involved. Security problems, with
respect to the large number of customers—domestic agencies,
close allies, and other foreign countries—as well as ques-
tions of proprietary information also halp confuse the
issue. In March, 1965, the DOD issued a new instruction to
provide uniform policy guidance for security classification
of official information. Application of its provisions is
expected to redu:e th-a quantity of classified information
and material, thereby facilitating the flow of scientific
and technical information and Defense-deveioped material
into non-Defense activities.
"Security Guide is Issued," Naval Aviation News
,
NAVWEP.J No. 00-75R-3 (March, 1965), URT.
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One could question whether this activity is worth the
money and manpower that is being put into it. Congress has
become increasingly interested in the information resources
available to private industry, particularly those with
defense and space orientation. Those Committees that have
taken an interest in the subject have felt that the new
Defense Documentation Center renders an exceedingly signifi-
cant service, one which could, no doubt, be improved even
more if more resources were devoted to it. While there is a
limit to the amount that a small number of people and a
limited number of dollars can do in solving the over-all
problem of information flow, there is also a question of
diminishing returns; how much can be put into information
services and still reap benefits? The United States Govern-
ment is now spending approximately one hundred million
dollars a year for scientific and engineering information
2
services. This represents a considerable sum, and it does
not include indirectly-performed information services which
are a normal part of research and development contracts.
The Defense Documentation Center faces a tremendous
2United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Government Research, Documentation and
Dissemination of Research and Development Results , Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), Appendix
C-2.
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problem of capturing information which never enters into the
mainstream. It does not receive information from any of the
more than three hundred thousand subcontractors involved in
defense and space efforts , and it receives only one out of
3
every five Department of Defense-generated reports. If the
Defense Documentation Center has problems now, and if users
have problems getting the information available, the signifi-
cant fact is the mass of information that will become in-
creasingly more unavailable. And, perhaps it should never
become available! The point of diminishing returns may have
been reached long ago, and it would not really be doing a
service if 90 or 95 per cent of the available information
was collected and stored.
3Ibid., p. 28.
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THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INPUT TO
DEFENSE POLICY
The problems of selecting strategies and choosing
weapon systems today are quite unlike anything that existed
before the Second World War. Before that time, military
technology changed rather slowly in relation to the average
length of military or political careers. Both soldiers and
statesmen could learn most of what they needed to know about
military power and the relationship of weapons systems and
forces to national defense from their own direct experience
and by reading history books. But something new has been
happening in the past twenty years. In the words of Alain
C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems
Analysis)
:
Science and technology have gone through a "take-
off" and they are now in a period of rapid, acceler-
ating, and apparently self-sustaining growth. Nuclear
weapons, nuclear power, computers, large-scale rockets,
and space flights are but the most spectacular ex-
amples of a revolution which has been led by both
military men and civilian scientists. Before World
War II, we did not plan on technological change; we
merely adjusted to it. Now we are planning on it.
We are debating, whether inventions can be scheduled,
and we have weapons systems that are being called
obsolescent while still in production.
*
John W. Seigle (ed.), Readings in National Security
Problems , Volume IV (West Point, New York: The United States
Military Academy, 1964), p. 6.
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But the problem is complicated, in the face of the
expanding number of systems that could be bought, by being
unable to escape from the necessity for choice arising out
of the scarcity of available resources. The United States
today has only a limited amount of goods and services
available at any one time, and the gross national product,
though large, is limited. There is also only a finite num-
ber of manhours available for all forms of productive
activity. An attempt to develop and procure a dozen or more
distinctly different strategic nuclear delivery systems
would doubtless result in squandering the resources that are
available and not getting a good system in any of them.
Therefore, a choice has to be made.
The military worth of the proposed system is not the
only factor, as the cost also has to be considered. In the
Defense Departments view, "military effectiveness and cost
are simply two sides of the same coin" and must be consid-
ered Jointly in the decision-making process. Comptroller
Charles J. Hitch writes:
We do not use systems analysis or cost/effectiveness
studies as a substitute for sound and experienced mili-
tary judgment, but rather as a method to get before the
decision-maker the relevant data, organized in a way
most useful to him. There are and there should be many
other inputs to the decision-maker, particularly in
those areas which are not susceptible in whole or in
part to quantitative analysis. 2
2
" Wesley W. Posvar. et al. (eds.), American Defense
Policy (Baltimore: The Jolum Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 213 .
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How these imputs axe coordinated by the Defense Department
and the way they are fed to the decision-makers is the sub-
ject of this chapter. Policy guidance is a two-way affair.
Consultation can be extended to DDR&E, policies can be co-
ordinated with other government agencies, and policy recom-
mendations can be forwarded up the line. Each avenue will
be discussed.
I. CONSULTATION TO DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
The Defense Science Board
This Board was established in 1956, following the
recommendations made by the Hoover Commission. The Commis-
sion felt that the Defense Department should avail itself of
the best technical brains in the Nation, while, at the same
time, give the scientific community a direct channel into
the Defense establishment. The purpose of the Board is to
advise the Secretary of Defense through DDR&E on scientific
and technical matters of interest to the DOD. Through its
membership of distinguished men representing industry,
government, and the academic world, the Defense Science
Board serves as a connecting link between DDR&E and the sci-
entific and technical community of the United States.
The Board is composed of twenty-eight members, with
one full-time member, a DDR&E representative, who is
-... ...
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Executive Secretary to the Board. The eight ex officio mem-
bers are comprised of the following:
1. Chairman, General Advisory Committee of the AEC;
2. Chairman, Army Scientific Advisory Board;
3. Chairman, Navy Research Advisory Board;
4. Chairman, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board;
5. President, National Academy of Sciences;
6. Director, National Science Foundation;
7. Director, National Bureau of Standards; and
8. Deputy Administrator of NASA.
Twenty other members are selected on the basis of their
eminence in the field of research and development, including
management and long-range planning, as necessary to repre-
sent the interests of the offices of DDR&E. Presently, the
composition of the Board is loaded in favor of aeronautics,
astronautics, nuclear technology, and physics, although an
attempt is supposedly being made to broaden the Board's
representation. Appointments to the Board, usually of three
or four years' duration, are made by the Secretary of De-
fense, upon the recommendation of the DDR&E, and the con-
currence of the Chairman of the Defense Science Board.
Typically, the entire Science Board meets three times
each year, with executive committee meetings every two
months. In the past, Board reports made to Secretary
McNamara have not been accepted uncritically. It appears
from the records that the more specific a study dealing with
a weapons system is, the less impact it has. It is in the
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greatest effect* When the ODR&E and his Deputies meet with
the Board and executive committee, also often present are
the Assistant Secretaries and General and Flag Officers
responsible for the research and development programs in
the Military Departments as well as a representative from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, These meetings provide firsthand
face-to-face exchanges, to quicken and make more intimate
the flow of opinions between the Government officials and
their select advisers from the American scientific community,
II. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION
The Department of Defense has maintained effective
working relationships with the other two agencies who par-
ticipate in the defense research and development programs
,
the AEC and NASA, through two coordinating bodies, the Mili-
tary Liaison Committee and the Aeronautics and Astronautics
3Coordinating Board,
Military Liaison Committee
With respect to the AEC, the Military Liaison Com-
mittee has the statutory duty to coordinate all mutual DOD-
AEC activities, including research and development. As a
3United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Government Research, Federal Research
and Development Programs . Part l
f
HeariAgs (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 174,
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practical matter, since DDR&E is responsible for all De-
fense research and development, there is a direct and close
coordination of these activities between that office and all
divisions of the AEC, including the Commission itself.
Direct correspondence is passed through the Chairman of the
Military Liaison Committee, so that he is kept fully advised
of transactions.
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
This Board was created jointly by NASA and the DOD
in September, I960, The co-chairmen of the Board are the
Associate Directors of NASA and the DDR&E, representing the
Secretary of Defense, The Board has eleven members, six of
whom are chairmen of the six subsidiary panels which report
to the Board, two of whom are the co-chairmen, and the
balance of whom are raembers-at-large so as to provide repre-
sentation from all interested parties within the two agencies,
The six panels cover the principal areas of mutual concern to
NASA and the DOD, which are grouped as follows:
1, Manned space flight;
2. Unmanned spacecraft;
3. Launch vehicles;
4, Space flight ground environment;





The panels have served not merely as committees, but as
action groups to develop, coordinate, and implement plans






on the panels have in their capacity as within their agency
4the power to carry out some of these decisions.
To insure complete understanding between the two
agencies, the policy has been adopted that major decisions
involving both agencies will be the subject of basic agree-
ments ratified in writing, at the appropriate level.
III. DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING'S INPUT
Policy Recommendations
The DDR&E is the President's link with the Defense
research and development program in various ways. Of course,
the Secretary of Defense is the first in the organizational
chain to receive recommendations and formulate Department
policy. But the DDR&E himself is also a member of the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and also the
Directorate's position is one of the statutory members of
the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST).
PSAC is composed of eighteen distinguished scientists
who are appointed by the President for four-year terms. The
PSAC body presents a novel feature in the organization of
4United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations
,
Systems Development and Management , Part 2, Hearings
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the Presidency. They are not across-the-board, general
purpose counselors, but rather they are experts in one par-
ticular area. In giving the President professional advice
on scientific and technical questions , their role is akin to
that of the Council of Economic Advisors in its specialized
field.
PCST consists of the chief scientific officers of the
eight Federal agencies most heavily involved in scientific
activities. It is concerned primarily with resolving prob-
lems of a multi-agency nature and with coordinating the work
among the agencies. FCST leans heavily on the scientific
advice of PSAC and the National Academy of Science. Through
various committees and the Staff of the Office of Science
and Technology, FCST examines areas of primary national in-
terests where a concentrated effort and a government-wide
approach is deemed essential, either because of the magni-
tude of the activity or because of the multiplicity of the
agencies involved. Whole scientific fields are reviewed
with respect to scientific expectations and national goals,
as well as gaps and overlaps.
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, who as former Special Assist-
ant to the President for Science and Technology also held
the positions of Chairman of both PSAC and FCST along with
being the Director of the Office of Science and Technology,










when he commented that the Federal Council for Science and
Technology is " • • • essentially a sub-Cabinet for Science,
whose members have both a political or policy position and a
5technical position."
Dr. Ralph Sanders, "The Autumn of Power: The Sci-
entist in the Political Establishment," (Washington, D. C.
:






In the preceding pages, an attempt has been made to
analyze the organizations and activities of research and
development effort for national defense. Policy, plans,
programs, speculation, implementation, and arguments sweep
the spectrum from beefing-up efforts to cutting costs.
There is a tendency to look back, count the milestones of
real or alleged progress, and pause to celebrate. But, in
reality, more concentration is found on the little pockets
of offices all through the research and development organi-
zation and in field tests all over the world where new goals
of improved defense strength are just being shaped. These
goals range from point sharpening refinements of existing
routines through the brainstorming of new ideas to major
weapon systems programs.
I . SUMMARY
In broad generalities, it can be said that the De-
fense research and development effort, as organized and
energized by one Dr. Harold Brown, is just beginning to
become effective. In simplest terms, it all means, on the
larger scale, a group of dedicated people have learned how
to work well together, generally within the McNamara-instilled
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framework* The McNamara reign in the Pentagon has been de-
picted as "forced feeding of a diet of management*" Opposi-
tion to the diet has gradually subsided and now many Depart-
ment of Defense personnel, both military and civilians, have
become addicted and are "hooked" for life on the precepts of
Xgood management*
Nowhere is this addiction better indicated than in
DDR&E. After an extended period, in which DDR&E exercised
considerable control over the research and development func-
tions of the Services, Dr. Brown is reportedly returning the
reins back to the Military Departments* He is doing more
toward building up the stature of the three Assistant Secre-
taries of research and development than any of his prede-
cessors*
Of course, there are critics, such as Hanson Baldwin,
who maintains that there has been a "definite reduction • • ,
in the evolution and production of new weapons • • • and
more development contracts have probably been canceled than
2have new ones been initiated*" His criticism could be
interpreted as saying that not enough money is being wasted*
He apparently feels that there should be considerably more
1
"Defense Research and Engineering," Armed Forces
Management , XI (November, 1964), 68*
2Hanson W # Baldwin, "Slow-Down in the Pentagon,"
Foreign Affairs . XLIII (January, 1965), p. 263.
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decision-making within the Services and less supervision
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This feeling
is to some extent oriented toward the old system of each
Service writing its own ticket. In the interest of elimi-
nating—not healthy service competition—but duplicatory and
unnecessary Service rivalry, Baldwin recommends the follow-
ing:
1. Abandon attempts, keyed primarily to costs, not
effectiveness, to force Service weapons sys-
tems into "all purpose" molds. "Commonality"
develops naturally from actual technological
accomplishments, not from "project definition
phases" or paper plans.
2. Return, Insofar as possible, to competition in
hardware rather than competition on paper.
The end product is almost certain to be bet-
ter, and ultimately may cost less.
3. Sponsorship, within a Service, or by two or
more Services , of competitive research and
development projects, all having a common
goal, but each following different technologi-
cal paths to that goal.
4. Definite selection by the Defense Department at
the earliest possible stage of the best proj-
ect; cancellation of the others.-*
A look at the above recommendations would indicate
that the "project definition phases" criticized in point
number one is designed to accomplish the recommendation of
point number four. Points number two and three are coun-
tered by DDR&E recommendations that the Military Departments
3Ibid., pp. 279-280.
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should be encouraged to increase the flexibility of program-
ming documentation in advanced developments by directing it
less toward definitive single-system solutions and more
toward the use of multiple approaches.
The problem of national defense has become extremely
complicated technically, and the scientific method is a
powerful intellectual tool to supplement conventional
decision-making norms. This method combines logic and em-
pirical evidence with deductive and inductive reasoning in
an explicit and verifiable presentation of the hypothesis
and its acceptance or rejection. It aims at objectivity by
minimizing the influence of personalities or vested inter-
ests. While the theoretical tests of the conclusions are
based on logic, experiments, and history, unfortunately,
fully-realistic proofs come only in the exchange of battle.
While the methods are, by purpose, scientific, their appli-
cation synthesizes many subjective valuations and estimates.
Personal assessments guide the collection, processing and
interpretation of cost and effectiveness data, and it is
difficult for the participants to exclude special prefer-
ences for this or that course of action. Except where there
is a simple, one-dimensional objective under scrutiny,
judgment exercises a critical role in designing the analyses,
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In instances where the "data" per se involves the
exercise of judgment, or in the field of interpersonal or
international relationships where complex patterns of be-
havior are the rule, such techniques are not infallible aids
in framing reliable value premises. The personnel partici-
pating in these investigations must constantly be aware of
the assumptions made in the model, query the reliability and
range of error of the data, and recognize that many perti-
nent aspects to the methods will never achieve mathematical
expression. It must be realized that the scientific method,
then, is simply one of several means to an end.
Francis X. Kane, writing in Fortune, criticized De-
fense's attempt to search for perfection on paper before any
operation begins. He says:
The closer the planner approaches perfection, the
more certain he will be that he possesses the edge on
the enemy. If certainty is unattainable, it is also
unnecessary. This observation applies especially to
current requirements that the results of the research
and development process be certified before the process
is begun. As military affairs go now, schedules,
results, and costs must be forecast before a new pro-
ject is approved; quantitative measurements are the
principal criteria of progress. Clearly by any stand-
ard and by the primary practical standards this goal
is unattainable. In practice, the need for forecasting
with certainty is a barrier against constructive
action. 4
4Francis X. Kane, "Security is Too Important to be















If one is to believe Mr, Enthoven when he talks about
the limitations on money and manpower along with the in-
crease in number and cost of potential weapons systems, Mr.
Kane's argument loses its credibility.
Of particular concern in the defense posture is the
level of effort in advanced developments. Security effec-
tiveness is largely determined by the state of scientific
and technological advancements. New systems must be aggres-
sively pursued, based on both the assessment of the threat
and the pace of technology. One of the most serious criti-
cisms of present procedures is leveled against a "tight"
research and development budget with emphasis primarily on
operational improvements. Although improvements are needed
on existing operational systems , an evaluation of the threat
clearly shows that the need becomes even more crucial in the
late 1960's and early 1970' s, when new concepts and systems
will be required. A "tight" approach does not permit the
flexibility to explore potential concepts that might provide
some of the solutions being sought. This is not to imply
that money should be wasted on projects that are not needed;
but when faced with problems in an area that is both crucial
and extremely complex, new ideas and new programs cannot be
strait-jacketed by either a lack of funds or a lack of en-
couragement to explore new avenues.
A corollary matter that is also pertinent is the
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effect on initiative and morale in both the defense agencies
and industry which have the responsibility for conceiving and
developing new systems. Considering the challenges that
face the United States, due to the advances in technology
and the capability of the expected opponent, research and
development personnel should be encouraged, not stifled, to
generate new ideas and systems. By holding down the level
of funds and delaying decisions to go ahead on development
and production programs , initiative from which new concepts
might be realized is discouraged.
Wails of remorse from pessimistic sources in defense
industry appear quite unfounded, but frequent, in lieu of
figures released by the Department of Defense concerning ex-
penditures in the area of military research and development.
The figures indicate that the research and development budget
was expected to level off in the forthcoming years. Cries
of anguish predicted the complete collapse of the defense
market. DDR&E' s reply to these protests are, "we are not in
5business to keep industry alive." Made in terms of a
simple statement of policy, DDR&E meant that the sole aim of
the Defense Department is not to maintain a prosperous and
thriving defense industry. Granted, this industry is a very
5
Donald W. Coble, "Does DDR&E Overcontrol V , " Armed
Forces Management , XI (October, 1964), p. 29.
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vital part of the nation's defense effort. Eugene G. Fubini,
Deputy Director of DDR&E, wrote that he or the members of
the DOD cannot always know what is needed. He believed that
it was up to industry to discover the needs that are present
but not recognized. But, in this era of rising costs and
sophisticated technologies, a longer and harder look must be
taken at programs and the companies developing them before
obligating the millions of dollars it takes to vitalize a
system.
Some facts concerning Department of Defense research
and development expenditures over the past four years may
indicate the state of the situation.
1. The last approved budget was the third highest
since World War II.
2. There has been a 50 per cent increase in expendi-
tures over the level prevailing during the four
preceding years.
3. Over twenty-six billion dollars have been in-
vested in the program, one billion dollars more
than were spent during the entire eight previ-
ous years.
4. In 1964, seven cents of every dollar spent by the
Federal Government went for this program.
5. More than two hundred major new projects have
been undertaken since 1961, including some
seventy-seven weapons programs each costing
more than ten million dollars. 7 In 1964, as
much was spent to explore the military aspects
of space as was spent on the entire space pro-
gram four years ago.
Eugene G. Fubini, "The Future of Defense Research
and Development t " Signal , XIX (September, 1964), 29.
7
"Defense Research and Engineering," Armed Forces
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6, More than $234,000,000 a year is being invested
in basic research, 66 per cent more than was
spent for the same purpose in I960,
Expenditures do not, of course, tell the entire re-
search and development story. Under the guidance of Dr.
Brown, who ably practices what Secretary McNamara preaches,
an attempt is being made by Defense to obtain a better prod-
uct in terms of efficiency and quality. The methods used by
the DOD have two positive values. They provide the decision-
maker with a set of carefully-described alternatives which,
nevertheless, do not preclude other courses of actions and
which should be tested against other criteria to ascertain
their effect on organizational goals. Decision-makers
should not look for a single optimum solution, possible only
in the abstract, but rather for guidelines of a preliminary
but not necessarily definitive sort. Secondly, the methods
challenge non-staff personnel to defend their own preconcep-
tions. From this interaction of challenge and response,
there emanates new alternatives, procedures and policies.
Few will deny that full costing of weapons systems,
the projection of five-year budgets, the prudent weighing of
immediate and long-run benefits, and closer scrutiny of re-
search and development proposals must bear fruit in a more
Q
John J. Clark, "The Management of National Defense
by Systems Analysis: An Evaluation," The Royal United












efficient and economical Defense establishment. By chal-
lenging the status quo and forcing scrutinization of
accepted practices, the review initiated and the consequent
obligation to defend and challenge opposing viewpoints leads
inexorably in the spirit of scientific inquiry to alterna-
tive methods of achieving the desired objectives. Goals
have always been similar, but now methods of accomplishment
are also becoming increasingly similar as Defense standard-




Since the United States has departed from isolation
to become involved in the world system of power rivalries,
science and technology have reached a position of unprece-
dented importance in the maintenance of national defense.
An understanding of the ways in which research and develop-
ment are continuously changing the conditions of social,
industrial, political, and military affairs; and an extreme
alertness to their potentialities for future change are
essential in the military forces. In fact, one of the
gravest defects which could exist in the defense system of
any major power in this period would be a feeling of con-
tentment regarding national armaments and the national
economy, in general. An attitude of satisfaction with
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things as they are would be apt to result in inaction, per-
mitting the tide of technology to rush past, leaving the
Nation's defense obsolete and insecure.
Another facet of this conclusion is that, in reality,
there is no particular national security program that is
needed in an absolute sense. The question is, how much is
needed for one defense program more than is needed for the
other purposes? To get the most out of the Nation's re-
sources, fewer billions may have to be spent on some activi-
ties which are worth less to the Nation than they cost, to
allow more for programs that yield greater values than the
costs incurred. Although military worth may be defined as
capabilities to inflict specified damage upon an enemy under
described technological conditions , a methodology has not
been devised to permit military worth to be expressed in any
common denominator which makes it directly comparable to
costs. This deficiency sets up a formidable obstacle to
pinpointing the optimal solution, compared to the market
place, wherein money serves as the common denominator of
9
worth and costs.
The United States finds itself in a situation of un-
precedented technological challenge. The resources which
9Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University













are available to do the job are far less, relative to the
size of the job, than what has been available in the past.
Unprecedented technological challenge does not necessarily
mean that better ideas will be coming along every day or
that more revolutionary changes will come even faster. As a
general rule, the developments that will become available,
if successful, would add only marginally to the over-all
strength. There have been and are exceptions—-developments
which can add a new and unique dimension to a capability,
such as the hydrogen bomb, the ballistic missile, and the
nuclear submarine. These developments are factors of a
thousand improvement, and are harder to come by. Dr. Brown
maintains that a factor of ten improvement in today 1 s inno-
vations is worth big research and development investment.
When the potential pay-off is extremely great, cor-
respondingly-greater costs and risks are justified, but
developments which meet this test are rare. The typical
development promises, if successful, to achieve a capability
that can also be achieved in other ways, usually the more
extensive or imaginative use of existing weapons. In such
cases, the urgency is not so great.
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appro-
priations Bill , 1966 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, June 17, 1965), pp. 79-80.
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However, the scientists are not giving up. Dr. James
R. Killian, former Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology expresses his view with:
I am troubled when I hear statements about our
having reached some kind of plateau in our inven-
tions and development of new weapons, • • • The cold
war is not over; our military technological innova-
tions must advance ... maintaining a margin of
superiority is not partisan and can be accomplished
only by an advancing military technology. Our science
and technology must be so good and so far out on the
frontier that it is we who have the capability to
anticipate advances and do things uniraagined by
others, 11
For any nation, research and development constitutes
an essential element of progress and, in particular, of
national defense and economic strength. The various systems
on which the United States national defense rests are the
products not of circumstance but of the most astute research
and development planning that man and machine can provide.
The planning anticipates the hardware for as far as a score
of years into the future. Beyond the plans lie the proc-
esses that carry the new idea from the drawing board to the
active inventory. As the formula grows more complex, the
function of the policy-makers * decisions becomes ever greater
in compounding the elixir for technological supremacy.
These decisions are critically dependent upon able leadership
and staffing within the governmental departments and agencies,
James R. Killian, "The Innovation Industry in Tran-
sition, u TechnpJ^oo^ Review, LXVI (June, 1964), 40.








It is concluded that the basic concept of organizing
research and development activities around the missions of
departments and agencies is sound and should not be signifi-
cantly altered. The benefits of vitality, flexibility, and
control offered by decentralized mission orientation are
significant and should be preserved. With few exceptions,
intra-agency research and development policy formulation is
the strongest aspect of policy formulation in the Executive
branch. The specters of overlap, gaps, conflicts, and
duplication among agency programs can best be met through
adequate top-level coordination of agency programs to meet
total national needs. Inter-agency coordination considers
key policy questions, such as the effective development and
utilization of research resources, the proper roles for
research-performing institutions, the impact of research and
development on particular economic and regional sectors, and
the maintenance of an adequate research and development base
to support economic and national defense policy.
Today, the research and development program is one of
the most critical elements of the Nation's strength. A sum-
mary of the basis for this program is as follows:
1. There is a need to strive for substantial
superiority in a technological war which has
no current prospect of ending.
2. There are direct and important relationships
between threat, strategy, and national defense










3. During the past ten years, the scope of research
and development has expanded dramatically in
response to the requirements of national
strategy,
4. Research and development has successfully met its
principal objective by providing superior
weapons systems in an attempt to assure na-
tional survival.
5. Research and development is proceeding with a
broad range of development programs and tech-
nology in an effort to maintain military
superiority.
Technological superiority alone does not guarantee
national survival, but it is an essential part of national
security and must be maintained. Choosing the technologies
which are to be supported, the development programs which
are to be carried out, and the way they are to be managed
is, therefore, one of the Nation's most vital tasks. It is
necessary that the process of selection between a myriad of
possibilities be made more carefully when "imminent danger"
is not present; to do otherwise would involve an absurd pro-
liferation of marginally useful items. Making the choice is
a most difficult job, but one which must be done by defense
research and development.
The Federal research and development effort has the
capability to make quantum advances if pursued aggressively
and purposefully. Such effort will pay off by continuing to
produce a deterrent capability in future years to insure the
security of the United States. But these efforts cannot
succeed if impeded by too rigid demands that operational
evsb bn* riD*«s8©fl .fc
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requirements be specifically defined before allowing new
technical developments to be undertaken. Such restrictions
stifle creativity, the evolution of new ideas, and the in-
centive to explore new horizons of science and technology.
The pace of advancement must reflect both a realistic
assessment of the threat and the advances in technology. An
orientation to reflect this approach, coupled with the
necessary decisions to implement it, is required to reduce
the possibility of increasing vulnerability during the next
decade.
It is not recommended that funds be expended on
worthless items; but if an error is made, it should be on
the side of too much, rather than too little. In other
words, the approach should be to pursue new concepts and
ideas so they will supply the best operational alternatives
to the national defense decision-makers, if the requirement
ever arises.
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